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The Right of Prisoner Access:
Does Bounds Have Bounds?
JOSEPHINE R. POTUTO*

In Bounds v. Smith' the United States Supreme Court held that "the fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities
to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by
providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from
persons trained in the law."' 2 This article focuses on the source of the right as
a means of defining its scope as well as its particular application with respect
to the law library alternative under Bounds.3
RIGHT OF ACCESS: FROM WHENCE DOES IT COME?

Ex parte Hull4 is generally singled out as the first case in which the
7
6
5
Supreme Court found a right of access by prisoners to the federal courts.
*B.A. 1967, Douglass College; M.A. 1971, Seton Hall; J.D. 1974, Rutgers. Assistant Professor of Law University of Nebraska. Project Director and Reporter, Uniform Sentencing and
Corrections Act (First and Second Tentative Drafts were titled Uniform Corrections Act).
'Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
1d. at 828.
3
1n Bounds, North Carolina proposed to assure access by providing law libraries rather
than legal services. See id. at 826-27, 833. The Bounds majority thus concerned itself with
whether the state's law library proposal was adequate. Id. at 817-33. It did not have before it
and did not focus, therefore, on what would constitute- adequate legal services. This Article, as
did the Court, will concentrate on the law library alternative. For a discussion of the adequacy
and appropriate structuring of legal services programs see notes 117, 128, and 129 infra.
4312 U.S. 546 (1941).
5
The right of access is developing in more areas than the prisoner or even criminal justice
context. See note 63 infra. It has been described as "the right upon which the integrity of every
other constitutional right necessarily rests." Johnson v. Anderson, 370 F. Supp. 1373, 1383 (D.
Del. 1974). Accord, Goodpaster, The Integration of Equal Protection, Due Process Standards,
and the Indigent's Right of Free Access to the Courts, 50 IOwA L. REv. 223, 253 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Goodpaster].
6The class of incarcerated persons includes pretrial detainees, defendants incarcerated during trial, and convicted persons sentenced to a term of imprisonment. For purposes of this Article, "prisoner" refers to all incarcerated persons except the incarcerated pro se defendant seeking
legal materials to prepare his defense at trial.
'See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821-22 (1977). The cases have dealt, so far, with
prisoners seeking access to federal court. Eg., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974);
Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971), affg Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F. Supp. 105 (N.D. Cal.
1970); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969); Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941); Bounds v.
Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977). The right is similarly applicable to claims in state court. See id. at
833 (Powell, J.,concurring).
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In Hull, prison officials had refused to notarize or mail the prisoner's petition
for writ of habeas corpus. 8 The Court there held that:
the state and its officers may not abridge or impair petitioner's right to apply
to a federal court for a writ of habeas corpus. Whether a writ of habeas corpus addressed to a federal court is properly drawn and what allegations it
must contain are questions for that court alone to determine. 9
Although cited as the first right of access case, 10 the Hull Court seemed as
much, if not more, concerned with asserting a court's traditional jurisdictional perogative to pass on the form and merits of a claim addressed to it"
than with prisoner rights generally or even with the "fundamental importance"1 2 of the "great writ. 13s In concluding that Hull could not be prevented
from petitioning it, the Court did state, however, a basic, and essentially
unarguable proposition-a state may not actively impede persons incarcerated
in its prisons from petitioning a court to review the legality of the incarceration.1 4 It is from this basic proposition that the right of access evolved.
The next major prisoner right of access case was Johnson v. Avery.' In
Avery, prisoners were prohibited from assisting each other in preparing writs
and other legal documents. 6 The prohibition against such "jailhouse lawyers"
developed from a distrust of their dedication and competence and a fear of
the power base they might create for themselves within facilities.17 The Court
'312 U.S. at 547-48. Hull's father, acting as his "agent," filed the papers with the Court.
Id. at 548.
'312 U.S. at 549.
"OBounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821-22 (1977).
"See, e.g., Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 681-82 (1946); Louisville & N. R.R. v. Mottley,

211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908).
"Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 485 (1969). See United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205
(1952).
IsEx parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 95 (1807).
141t
is a proposition agreed to by even the dissenters in Bounds, 430 U.S. at 834-35 (Burger,
C.J., dissenting) and 840 (Rehnquist, J.,dissenting). It is, in fact, an aspect of the more encompassing proposition-persons may not be impeded from reaching a court with their claims. See
note 39 infra & text accompanying.
13593 U.S. 483 (1969). This case was described as the most important decision with respect
to weakening the hands-off doctrine of federal courts considering prisoner claims. Champagne &
Haas, The Impact of Jonson v. Avery on Prison Administration, 43 TENN. L. REV. 275, 275
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Champagne & Haas]. For discussion of the hands-off doctrine, see
Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972); Turner, Establishing the Rule of Law in Prisons: A
Mannualfor Prisoners' Rights Litigation, 23 STAN L. REV. 473, 503-04 (1971) [hereinafter cited
as Turner].
"1393 U.S. at 484.
"See, e.g., Bluth, Legal Servicesfor Inmates: Coopting theJailhous Lauyer, 1 CAP. U. L.
REv. 59, 59 (1972); [hereinafter cited as Bluth]; Brierley, The Legal Controversy as it Relates to
CorrectionalInstitutes-A Prison Administrator's View, 16 VILL. L. REv. 1070, 1071-72 (1971);
Champagne & Haas, supra note 15, at 298; Fousekis, PrisonerMutual Legal Assistance and Access to the Courts: Recent Developments and Emerging Problems, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 1089, 1093
(1972); Spector, A Prison Librarian Looks at Writ-Writing, .56 CALIF. L. REv. 365, 365 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as Spector]; 56 CALIF. L. REv. 342, 342-43 (1968). In a survey of wardens conducted to determine the impact of Avery on prison administration no clear consensus emerged as
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found, however, that prohibiting jailhouse lawyers from assisting other
prisoners prevented, "for all practical purposes," illiterate prisoners from having their claims heard.18 Avery, then, proceeded one step beyond Hull. It
equated the practice of preventing jailhouse lawyers from assisting prisoners
to petition the Court with the actual prevention of prisoners from petitioning
the Court that was operative in Hull. The two cases had much in common.
In each, the Court was concerned with an official correctional policy that
acted to prohibit particular prisoner activity. In each, the Court defined the
scope of a state's duty with respect to the right of access as a duty to
eliminate state-created impediments to a prisoner's ability to assert his claim
in a federal court.19 And in each, the Court had under consideration prisoner
access to the court by way of the writ of habeas corpus. In fact, the Avery
Court in construing the right of access in a practical sense relied heavily upon
the importance of the writ of habeas corpus to the American constitutional
system. 20 It concluded that, "since the basic purpose of the writ is to enable
those unlawfully incarcerated to obtain their freedom, it is fundamental that
access of prisoners to the courts for the purpose of presenting their complaints
may not be denied or obstructed." 21 Thus the Avery Court did not change
the basic import of the Hull right of access. That right of access was an admonition to the states that they must stand neutral when prisoners seek entrance to federal court by writ of habeas corpus.
The Avery Court, however, in apparent recognition of the distrust of
jailhouse lawyers by many correctional administrators,22 went on to offer the
to whether jailhouse lawyers have increased the incidence of prison disciplinary problems. See
Champagne & Haas, supra note 15, at 284. The wardens were divided almost equally on whether
jailhouse lawyers after Avery attained an increased power base in the prisons. Id. at 291, 292-93.
'9Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. at 487 (Quoting the district court, 252 F. Supp. 783, 784

(1966)). See Champagne & Haas, supra note 15, at 276.
"5 Turner, supra note 15, at 478. State-created impediments can include fees which the indigent cannot pay. See cases cited at note 33 infra.
20393 U.S. 485.
21

1d.

22See authorities cited at note 17 supra. This distrust is not universal. For discussion of the
merits and demerits of the jailhouse lawyer see, ABA JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE LEGAL STATUS OF
PRISONERS,

STANDARDS

RELATING TO THE LEGAL STATUS

OF PRISONERS

(Tent. Draft 1977),

reprinted in 14 AM. CIuM. L. REV. 377, 434 (1977) [hereinafter cited as ABA JOINT COMM.];
ABA RESOURCE CENTER ON CORRECTIONAL LAW AND LEGAL SERVICES. PROVIDING LEGAL SERVICES
TO PRISONERS, reprinted in 8 GA. L. REV. 563, 413-14 (1974) [hereinafter cited as ABA
RESOURCE CENTER]; Wexler, The Jailhouse Lawyer As A Paraprofessional: Problems and Prospects, 7 CPiM. L. BULL. 159, 139-53 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Wexler]; Zeigler & Hermann,
The Invisible Litigant: An Inside View of Pro Se Actions in the Federal Courts, 47 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 157, 174-75 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Zeigler & Hermann]; Note, Trial Court and Prison
Perspectives on the Collateral Post Conviction Relief Process in Florida, 21 U. FLA. L. REV. 503,
507 (1969). For reasons asserted in support of the operation of jailhouse lawyers, see Johnson v.
Avery, 393 U.S. at 496-98 (Douglas, J., concurring); Bolick v. State, 127 Ga. App. 542, 542, 194
S.E.2d 302, 303 (1972). See Larsen, A PrisonerLooks at Writ-Writing, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 543,
348-49 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Larsen]; Comment, Prisoners'Rights-Accessto Courts, 42 U.
COLO. L. REV. 275, 291 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Prisoners'Rights]; Note, Legal Services for
Prison Inmates, 1967 Wis. L. REy. 514, 514 [hereinafter cited as Inmate Legal Services].
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states an alternative to permitting the operation of jailhouse lawyers: a state
could choose to provide adequate legal assistance itself. The Court indicated
that its only interest was to assure illiterate prisoners access to the courts. A
state could meet this interest by providing an "available alternativ" 23 to the
operation of jailhouse lawyers. The available alternative in Avery would require the states to expend funds but only as an alternative since a state unwilling to so obligate funds had only to permit jailhouse lawyers to operate
within its prisons.
In Gilmore v. Lynch24 the scope of the right of access increased
dramatically. The district court talked of "meaningful access.1 25 "Meaningful
access" meant that a state had to expend funds to provide either law libraries
or legal services to prisoners.26 Thus what was, under Avery, an admonition
to the states not to impede access and an opportunity for the states to choose
to do more became, under Gilmore, an affirmative state burden2 7 requiring a
state to spend money where previously it had merely to stand neutral. The
Court described this new right of access as a "constitutional imperative"2 8 but
did not provide its constitutional derivation.
The Court did find, however, that the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment required the states to provide indigent prisoners with
"the tools necessary to receive adequate hearing in the courts ...."29 It cited
three cases as supportive of an equal protection rationale for its result:
Douglas v. California,30 Griffin v. Illinois,5 ' and Gideon v. Wainwright.32 The
2s393 U.S. at 488.
24319 F. Supp. 105 (N.D. Cal. 1970), affd sub nom, Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15
(1971). The United States Supreme Court affirmed Gilmore v. Lynch in a per curiam opinion
that merely cited Johnson v. Avery.
:5319 F. Supp. at 109.
56
1d. at 112. See generally Farrington v. State of North Carolina, 391 F. Supp. 714, 720
(M.D.N.C. 1975); Johnson v. Anderson, 370 F. Supp. 1373, 1385 (D. Del. 1974); Hampton v.
Schauer, 361 F. Supp. 641, 643 (D. Colo. 1973); ABA RESOURCE CENTER, supra note 22, at 365;
Reeves, The Evolving Law of Prison Law Libraries, 3 NEW ENGLAND J. PRISON L. 131, 137
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Reeves]; Comment, Prisoners' Right to Access to Legal Material, 8
GoNz. L. REV. 340, 350-51 (1973); Prisoner'Rights, supra note 22, at 276. Under Gilmore, the
prisoner has to demonstrate that the correctional regulation unduly burdens his right of access.
319 F. Supp. at 109. It then becomes the state's burden to show that available legal services are
adequate and that there is no obligation to provide law libraries. E.g., Nooriander v. Ciccone,
489 F.2d 642, 650-51 (8th Cir. 1973); Novak v. Beto, 453 F.2d 661, 664 (5th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 968 (1972); ABA RESOURCE CENTER, supra note 22, at 367; Werner, The Present Legal Status and Conditions of Prison Law Libraries, 66 LAw LIB. J. 259, 260 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Werner]. Whether a state meets its obligation to assure access is an evalua-

tion to be made by considering the state's program as a whole. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817,
832 (1977).
21The Court, however, saw its approach as placing no more burden on the states than was
already required under Avery. 319 F. Supp. at 110.
2B319 F. Supp. at 109.
9
2 1d.
30372 U.S. 353 (1963).

s1351 U.S. 12 (1956).
32372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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Douglas and Griffin line of cases,33 however, prevents states from imposing
financial impediments between indigents and a state-created right. The
underpinning of these cases is that once the state sets up a procedure such as
appellate review it must treat indigents on an equal basis with nonindigents.34
In Gilmore, however, the state obligation arises by court dictate not by
state choice; the state, after all, did not create the right of federal habeas
review. Gilmore would be apposite, then, if the state, for example, chose to
provide legal services to prisoners seeking to file writs of habeas corpus-and
s6
s
charged fees of prisoners using such services.3 The Gideon line of cases
deals specifically with the fundamental nature of the right to counsel to
"These cases derive from an equal protection or due-process-equal protection analysis.
See Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 608-09 (1974); Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227
(1971). They deal either with post-conviction procedures or with what must be supplied indigents
pre- and post-trial. E.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (state may not charge costs
precluding indigent from acquiring trial transcript or adequate alternative for appellate review)
[See Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963) (state must provide indigent with record of sufficient completeness to challenge trial judge denial of free trial transcript for appellate review);
Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971) (alternative to trial transcript adequate)]; Smith
v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961) (state may not charge filing fee precluding indigent from appellant or habeas review); Burns v. Ohio 360 U.S. 252 (1959) (state may not charge filing fee
precluding indigent from second, discretionary appeal); Long v. District Court of Iowa, 385 U.S.
192 (1966) (per curiam) (state may not charge costs precluding indigent from acquiring habeas
hearing transcript or adequate alternative for appellate review of writ denial) [See Lane v.
Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963) (transcript of hearing denying writ of error coram nobis); Gardner v.
California, 593 U.S. 367 (1969) (transcript of first habeas hearing for use at subsequent habeas
hearing)]; Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40 (1967) (per curiam) (state may not charge costs
precluding indigent from obtaining pretrial transcript or adequate alternative for use at trial);
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (state may not preclude indigent from full scope of
appellate review by denying counsel on appeal). See also Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17,
24 n.11 (1973); People v. Shipman, 62 Cal. 2d 226, 397 P.2d 993, 996, 142 Cal.Rptr. 1, See
generally Goodpaster, supra note 6, at 254; Note, The Indigent's Right to Counsel in Civil Cases,
76 YALE L.J. 545, 560 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Counsel in Civil Cases]. But see Note, Right to
Aid in Addition to Counsel for Indigent CriminalDefendants, 47 MINN. L. REV. 1054, 1073-77
(1963). The Court appears unwilling to extend this line of cases any further. See, e.g., Ross v.
Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 610 (1974) (state need not appoint counsel for discretionary appeal following appeal as of right). Cf. United States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317, 325-26 (1976) (federal
government need not provide indigent with trial transcript for § 2255 motion prior to finding of
"not friviolous"). See also Note, The Indigent's "Right" to Counsel in Civil Cases, 43 FORDHAM L.
REV. 989, 991 (1975) [hereinafter cited as "Right" to Counsel]; Note, Criminal Procedure-No
Right to Counsel on DiscretionaryAppeal, 53 N.C. L. REv. 560, 561-71 (1975).
"4See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 838. (Rehnquist, J.,dissenting). But see Note,
Criminal Procedure-No Right to Counsel on Discretionary Appeal, 53 N.C. L. REv. 560,
562-63 (1975). Meeting the requirements of equal protection has never meant affording "identity
of treatment." Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 277, 291 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring). It
only requires that indigents be afforded similar opportunities for the assertion of rights. See
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 724 (1969); Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 308-09
(1966).
s5See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 22 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Page v.
Sharpe, 487 F.2d 567, 569 (1st Cir. 1973).
SSee cases cited at note 132 infra.
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assure a fair trial under the 6th amendment.3 7 It is not an equal protection
case and thus seems irrelevant to the equal protection analysis in Gilmore.
Further, since habeas corpus is not a sixth amendment right 8 Gideon cannot,
on a 6th amendment theory, be extended to include prisoners petitioning for
writ of habeas corpus. It is support, however, for the general proposition that
the Court can direct states to expand funds in furtherance of constitutional
rights.3 9 Thus, to the extent that meaningful access in Gilmore is restricted to
the assertion of constitutional rights, 40 or at least those constitutional rights as
fundamental as the right to counsel at a criminal trial, then Gilmore,
although an extension from Avery, may well have been on firm ground.
Because the Gilmore case for finding an obligation on the states to expend funds to assist prisoners filing petitions for writ of habeas corpus can be
seen to center on the constitutional magnitude of the writ, the question
becomes whether and to what extent the writ of habeas corpus is constitutional. The writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, 41 while not a due pro-

37

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
"It would seem possible to argue that the right of prisoner access to the courts derives from
the sixth amendment right to a fair trial on the theory that an allegation of illegal confinement
sufficiently implicates the fairness of the trial that a sixth amendment right of access arises to
challenge the confinement. The major obstacle to finding such a derivation for the right of access is that the Court has consistently described the writ of habeas corpus as initiating a civil proceeding and has denied that its underpinnings lie in the sixth amendment. Ex parte Tom Tong,
108 U.S. 556, 559 (1883) ("Resort to [the writ of habeas corpus] sometimes becomes necessary,
because of what is done to enforce laws for the punishment of crimes, but the judicial proceeding
under it is not to inquire into the criminal act which is complained of, but into the right to liberty notwithstanding the act. . . . The prosecution against him is a criminal prosecution, but the
writ of habeas corpus which he has obtained is not a proceeding in that prosecution."). Accord,
e.g., Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807). See generally Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
U.S. 539 (1974); Werner, Law Library Service to Prisoners-The Responsibility of Nonprison
Libraries, 63 LAw LIB. J. 231, 232 (1970); Comment, Right to Counsel in Criminal PostConviction Review Proceedings, 51 CALIF. L. Rv. 970, 979 (1963); Note, PrisonerAssistance on
Federal habeas Corpus Petitions, 19 STAN. L. REV. 887, 889 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Prisoner
Assistance]. It is, of course, true that the Court in other contexts has refused to find the
criminal-civil distinction controlling but has, instead, considered the consequences of an activity
in determining whether it should be treated as if it were a sixth amendment right. See cases and
authorities
cited at note 108 infra.
3
1This is, again, a proposition with which the dissent does not quarrel. Bounds v. Smith,
430 U.S. at 834 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). For examples of the proposition in action, see, e.g.,
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
"This restriction also seems implicit in Bounds.
41
The writ is commonly referred to as the writ of habeas corpus. See Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 474-75 n.6 (1975).
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cess42 or sixth 43 amendment right, is, of course, embodied in the Constitution. 44 The Court in Fay v. NoiaO found that a prisoner had a constitutional

right to petition for review by writ of habeas corpus to challenge the legal
and constitutional merits of his confinement. 4" The Court there described the

writ as grounded on the principle that:
[I]n a civilized society, government must always be accountable to the
judiciary for a man's imprisonment: if the imprisonment cannot be shown to
conform with the fundamental requirements of law, the individual is entitled
to his immediate release. Thus there is nothing novel in the fact that today
habeas corpus in the federal
courts provides a mode for the redress of denials
47
of due process of law.

The Court discussed whether Congress could deny the full common law
scope to the writ-the scope, that is, of the constitutional provision-without
unconstitutionally suspending the writ. 4 It did not answer the question since
it concluded that the statutory federal habeas jurisdiction49 was fully com42E.g., United States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. at 323. See Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708
(1961); Note, Adequate Appellate Review for Indigents: A Judicial Blend of Adequate Transcript
and Effective Counsel, 52 IowA L. REv. 902, 904 (1967). It thus may appear a strained argu-

ment that finds a due process right of access requiring a state to expend funds so that a prisoner
can file a habeas corpus petition that he has no due process right to file. But the argument remains tenable if the Article I habeas right is of the constitutional scope afforded it by Fay v.
Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963). See notes 46 & 55 infra & text accompanying.
"See note 38 supra & text accompanying.
4"U.S. CONST. art. 1 § 9 ch. 2: "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it."
:5372 U.S. 391 (1963).
' 61d. at 400. See United States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317, 334 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
47372 U.S. at 402. The writ originally applied to persons imprisoned under federal law.
Judiciary Act of 1789, c.20 § 14, 1 Stat. 81. It was later extended to include state prisoners. Act
of Feb. 5, 1867, c.28 § 1, 14 Stat. 385. Its historical use was to review questions of jurisdiction of
the sentencing court. E.g., Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193 (1830); In re Wood, 140 U.S.
278 (1891). Its use was gradually expanded by the Supreme Court until, in Fay, federal courts
were mandated to consider, with some limited exceptions, the merits of all prisoner claims that
incarceration resulted from the violation of their federal rights. 372 U.S. at 430-34. In the past
several years the Fay holding has undergone some retrenchment. Today, federal courts will not
entertain a state prisoner's claim that evidence obtained unconstitutionally was introduced at trial
if the prisoner had an opportunity to fully and fairly litigate the claim at trial. Stone v. Powell,
428 U.S. 465, 482 (1976). A similar claim by a federal prisoner may be entertained to the extent
it derives not from the constitutional scope of the writ but from the Court's supervisory powers
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970). 428 U.S. at 481 n.16. Failure to timely challenge the admission
at trial of inculpatory statements will also bar federal habeas review. Wainwright v. Sykes, 97
S.Ct. 2497 (1977). And absent a showing of cause and actual prejudice a prisoner failing to timely challenge grand jury composition may not obtain habeas review. Francis v. Henderson, 425
U.S. 536, 542 (1976). Cf Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. at 458.
48372 U.S. at 406.
49Id. The statutory grant for federal habeas corpus jurisdiction for federal prisoners is 28
U.S.C. § 2241 (1970); for state prisoners it is 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1970). A procedure alternative to
that used under habeas corpus, a motion to vacate the sentence, was provided to federal
prisoners in 1948. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970). This procedure must be used in lieu of the writ of
habeas corpus unless it is "inadequate or ineffective." Id. See Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372,
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mensurate with the scope of the common law writ. 0 It is today being argued
that the federal statute is not merely commensurate with the scope of the
common law writ but is, in fact, much broader" and that the obligation of
the federal courts to collaterally review convictions is either not a constitutional obligation 2 or is one only to the extent that it reflects the historical use
of the writ to review questions of the jurisdiction of the sentencing court.5 3
The resolution of the constitutional scope of the writ is significant, of course,
since on it turns a determination of whether the Gilmore right of prisoner access states a new constitutional rule.
While it is true that there has been expansion in the scope of the writ
over time 5' it does not necessarily follow that the expansion cannot be constitutional in magnitude, reflecting a modern, yet constitutional view of the
writ.55 And whetever the constitutional scope of the writ, to that extent, certainly, a constitutional obligation could have been placed on the states to expend funds to assist prisoners to assert this constitutional right. s6 Read this
way, the Gilmore decision requires a finding of the constitutional scope of the
writ of habeas corpus; but it is otherwise not a particularly novel decision.
s7
Then came Wolff v. McDonnell.
378 n.10 (1977); Note, DiscretionaryAppointment of Counsel at Post-Conviction Proceedings:
An UnconstitutionalBarrier to Effective Post-ConvictionRelief, 8 GA. L. REV. 434, 437 (1974).
The § 2255 motion was enacted by Congress to expedite and make more convenient habeas
corpus review. See, e.g., United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 219 (1952). The scope of §
2255 is as broad as that of habeas corpus. United States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317, 334 (1976)
(Stevens, J., dissenting); Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 343 (1974). The essential difference between §§ 2255 and 2241 is that under § 2255 the prisoner applies to the sentencing
court while under § 2241 he applies to the federal district court nearest the prison in which he is
incarcerated.
50372 U.S. at 405-06, 417.
1

" This is based on the view that the Fay holding described the scope of the federal habeas

statute and not the constitutional provision. See cases cited at note 53 infra. The dissenters in
Fay, of course, argued, and rightly, that the common law scope of the writ was restricted to
sentencing court jurisdictional questions. 372 U.S. at 448-63 (Harlan, J., dissenting). See note 47
supra for a discussion of the expansion in the scope of the writ.
52See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 835 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Swain v.
Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 384 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring) ("The sweep of the Suspension
Clause must be measured by reference to the intention of the Framers and their understanding of
what the writ of habeas corpus meant at the time the Constitution was drafted.").
5
E.g., Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? CollateralAttack on CriminalJudgment, 38 U.
Ca1. L. REV. 142, 170 (1970).
54See note 47 supra.
"Cf Farettav. California, 422 U.S. 806, 851-52 (1975) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (advising
against ignoring the historical development of a constitutional right by attempting to employ the
right, in its historical form, in a modern and quite different procedural context). This is an opinion in which the Chief Justice concurred. Id. at 843 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). See Fay v. Noia,
372 U.S. 391, 405-15 (1963). The view that the full scope of the writ is not constitutional does
not command a majority of the Court. Mr. justice Stevens, for example, writing for the majority
in Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 380 n.13 (1977), although expressly declining to consider the
extent to which the scope of the writ is constitutional, indicated dissatisfaction with the view that
the writ is not constitutional in scope.
"See cases cited at note 39 supra.
57418 U.S. 539 (1974).
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In Wolff the Court extended the right of access to section 19838 actions
and finally and explicitly fixed the derivative of the right: "[t]he right of access to the courts, upon which Avery" was premised, is founded in the Due
Process Clause and assures that no person will be denied the opportunity to
present to the judiciary allegations concerning violations of fundamental constitutional rights."6 0 Since due process, whose "fundamental requisite . . . is

the opportunity to be heard,"61 requires basic fairness in government's dealings with individuals, 6 2 it seems an eminently reasonable constitutional
derivative of the right of access.6 3 But this due process right of access described
in Wolff was the right enunciated in Avery-a right assuring a prisoner that a
state will not impede his ability to address a court with his claims- and not "the
full breadth of the right of access""4 which receives the Supreme Court's imprimatur in Bounds. Thus the Wolff inclusion of section 1983 actions asserting fundamental constitutional rights within the ambit of the right of access
is a development that is not only comprehensible but essentially unarguable"s
since basic fairness requires that a state not impede a person, whether
prisoner or not, from seeking what Mr. Justice Rehnquist calls "physical access"16 to the courts. And this would, of course, hold true for the assertion of
not just fundamental constitutional rights but for the assertion of any legal
claim.
The pre-Bounds prisoner right of access decisions, then, could have been
explained as finding that the due process right of prisoner access required (1)
affirmative state aid when constitutional habeas claims were asserted and (2)
8
5 Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage of any state or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
28 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). Section 1983 was originally enacted as Section 1 of the Act of April 20,
1871, ch. 22, 7 Stat. 3. The Constitution provides specific authorization for enactment of such
legislation. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV § 5.
51Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
60418 U.S. at 579. Accord, Corpus v. Estelle, 409 F. Supp. 1090, 1097 (S.D. Tex. 1975),
afjfd, 542 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1976).
G'See, e.g., Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914). Accord, Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254, 267 (1970); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932).
"2See, e.g., Note, Criminal Procedure-No Right to Counsel on DiscretionaryAppeal, 53.
N.C. L. REv. 560, 563 (1975).
63See note 60 supra. See, e.g., 401 U.S. at 375-76; Guajardo v. McAdams, 349 F. Supp.
211 S.D. Tex. 1972). vacated and remanded sub nom., Sands v. Wainwright, 491 F.2d 417 (5th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 948 (1974); 56 CALIF. L. Rev. 342, 342 (1968). Cf. Prisoner
Assistance, supra note 38, at 889. But see United States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317 (1976). The
right of access in other contexts has also been located in the due process clause. E.g., 401 U.S. at
377 409 F. Supp. at 1096-97. See, e.g., Meltzer v. G. Buck LeCraw & Co., 402 U.S. 954, 955
(1971); United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
"4Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 824 (1977).
"See note 14 supra and text accompanying.
"Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 838 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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that the states not impede prisoners pursuing section 1983 actions asserting
fundamental constitutional rights or, for that matter, any other legal claim.
The different treatment of habeas corpus could have been explained as
relating to the constitutional scope of the writ as well as to the fact that
habeas corpus allegations, allegations which go exclusively to the legality of
the confinement, bear a closer relationship to the confinement than would
any other constitutional claim. This would seem to have been a reasoned,
and reasonable, way to describe the scope of the right of access. The virtues
of describing the right in these terms are that its scope would have been
clearcut and its constitutional underpinnings unarguable. Additionally, this
right of access would not have unduly interposed the federal courts in the
operation of state government. 67 The Court in Bounds v. Smith, 68 unfortunately, did not so describe the right. It chose, instead, to include all section
1983 actions within the states affirmative obligation to provide legal assistance
or law libraries.
Thus the right of access progressed from a right asserted by the Court
essentially in protection of its own jurisdictional perogatives to a constitutional imperative requiring the expenditure of state funds to implement it. In
so describing this right of access, the Bounds Court left unanswered questions
as to its appropriate scope. Worse, it described a right of access which not
only cannot be easily contained but a right that seems logically to demand
expansion beyond its present scope.
Bounds v. Smith
In Bounds v. Smith North Carolina prisoners filed section 1983 actions
claiming that the State's failure to provide legal research facilities for
prisoners violated their right of access to the courts. Mr. Justice Marshall,
writing for the Court, agreed with the prisoners that the states have a due
process obligation to provide some type of legal assistance to prisoners. He
found no difference between habeas corpus and section 1983 actions for purposes of requiring such affirmative state assistance, described the Court directive to the states to spend money to implement section 1983 and habeas corpus rights as no different than other obligations that the Court has placed on
the states, 69 and noted the obligation of the states to provide indigents with
trial counsel70 and with transcripts of the trial and other stages of the
criminal proceeding as well as the obligation of the states to waive docket
67

That federal courts, in the interests of comity and federalism, should, whenever
possible,
refrain from intruding in state matters is a well-known doctrine. See, e.g., Apodoca v. Oregon,
406 U.S. 404, 366 (1972). (Powell, J., concurring); New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S.
262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.s. 362, 377 (1976).
68430 U.S. 817 (1977).
69
Id. at 824-25.
'°E.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25
(1972). For other instances in which the states are required by the sixth amendment to provide
counsel to indigents see note 132 infra.
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fees71 and to provide indigent prisoners with writing material, notary services,
and free mailing for their legal documents. 72 These cases, however, derive
either from a specific constitutional provision, the 6th amendment in the
right to counsel casess the first amendment in the cases dealing with writing
materials,74 or in general they do no more than require that the state operate
its own procedures fairly7s and not impede the implementation of federal
statutory rights.7 6 To the extent that the writ of habeas corpus is constitutional, it falls within these cases; unlike habeas corpus, however, a section
1983 action is not, in itself, of constitutional magnitude.
Section 1983 was enacted to provide a federal remedy and a federal
forum for the violation of federal civil rights occurring under color of state
law. 77 Although section 1983 actions often involve claims of violation of constitutional rights, 78 the right asserted may derive from a federal statute and
not the Constitution.7 9 Since a section 1983 action is not in itself a constitutional right it seems to represent the most extreme case that could be fit
under the affirmative right of access. Its inclusion suggests, in other words,
the "novel and doubtful"80 proposition that the Court can direct states to
"430 U.S. at 825. Mr. Justice Marshall did not set forth the cases requiring this. For a list
of many of them see note 33 supra.
"'For an example of such a case, see Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976).
Many states have independently assumed such a burden. E.g., Manual for Alas. State Adult Correc. Inst. § 705 (1972); Administration Plan Manual, N.J. Div'n of Correc. and Parole Std.
291.277 (1975); Pa. Bureau of Correc., Admin. Dir. BC-ADM 803 (1972); Ill. Correc. Adult
Div'n Admin. Reg. § 823 (1975). For a discussion of the Illinois regulation see Bach v. Coughlin,
508 F.2d 303, 308 (7th Cir. 1974). See also Morales v. Turman, 364 F. Supp. 166, 180 (E.D.
Tex. 1973) (describing Texas correctional policy of providing paper and postage for 3 letters
weekly pursuant to an order of the district court that was partly provoked by the numerous
beatings of prisoners). There is little dispute that the ability to communicate with the outside
world aids in the prisoner's "adjustment to life inside the facility as well as to his ability to readjust to life outside." Comment to UNIFORM CORRECTIONS ACT § 4-101, at 296 (2d Tent. Draft,
with comments, 1977) [hereinafter cited as UCA]. See G. SYKES, 'THE SoCIErY OF CAPTIvEs
122-29 (1958); D. GLASER, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A PRISON AND PAROLE SYSTEM 378-80 (1964);
PoLICY GUIDELINES, ASSOCIATION OF STATE CORRECTIONAL ADMINISTRATORS (1972).

"3See cases cited at note 132 infra.
74E.g., Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128, 141-42 (N.D. Cal. 1972). See Wilkinson
v. Skinner, 462 F.2d 670, 671-72, n.3 (2d Cir. 1972).
"5See notes 33 & 34 supra.
76See, e.g., Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 834-35 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
"Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 173 (1961) (Section 1983 requires override of state law inappropriately inconsistent with federal law and provides federal remedy when state remedy is
either inadequate or available only in theory). See, e.g., Nabmod, Section 1983 and the
"Background" of Tort Liability, 50 IND. L.J. 5, 7 (1974); Comment, Exhaustion of State Ad-

ministrative Remedies in Section 1983 Cases, 41 U. CHI. L. REv. 537, 552-53 (1974); Note, A
Limitation on Actions for Deprivation of Federal Rights, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 763, 763 (1968).
7See, e.g., 365 U.S. 167. In the context of prisoner litigation claims of violation of constitutional rights are often the basis of section 1983 actions. E.g., Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519
(1971); Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971).
"9See, e.g., Nahmod, Section 1983 and the "Background"of Tort Liability, 50 IND. L.J. 5,
8-9 & n.22 (1974).
"Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 835 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The expansion of the tight
of access to § 1983 actions is an expansion in an area in which prison officials are most sensitive
since these claims are directed at the treatment afforded prisoners by correctional employees or
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spend money to implement federal statutory rights. Moreover, if that is the
import of the Bounds holding, then it is difficult to frame a supportable
reason for the inclusion of section 1983 actions that does not also include
every other federal right, whether constitutional or statutory, within the right
of prisoners access. Since the Bounds opinion sounds in terms of constitutional rights, it is possible, but unlikely, that the import of the holding is that
an allegation of abridgement of any federal statutory right gives rise to a
right of access that is to be implemented by state expenditures. How, then, -is
the opinion to be read?
First, it is possible to argue for inclusion of section 1983 claims, even
those deriving from a statutory rather than a constitutional source, within a
right of access because of the overlap between claims which are raised in a
section 1983 action and those which require a writ of habeas corpus. 81 This
approach would limit the scope of the right of access to section 1983 and
habeas claims. The Court, however, has not only asserted that there is a difference between the two actions 82 but will probably continue to assert this difference so long as a state prisoner filing for writ of habeas corpus must exhaust state remedies " while a prisoner bringing a section 1983 claim need
not.8 4 This is not determinative of the issue, however, since the fact that the
two actions are different for purposes of an exhaustion requirement need not
mean that they cannot be sufficiently intermingled for purposes of the right
of access.
A second possible way to read the Bounds opinion would be to limit the
reach of Bounds to habeas actions and to the assertion of not all Section 1983
claims but only those that are claims of violation of fundamental constitutional rights. This approach, although not explicitly taken by the Court in
Bounds, has the virtue of excluding statutory section 1983 claims from the

through the operation of correctional regulations. See, e.g., Jacob & Sharma,JusticeAfter Trial:

Prisoners' Needs for Legal Services in The Criminal-CorrectionalProcess, 18 U. KAN. L. REv.
493, 519 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Jacob & Sharma].
"See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 579 (1974).
"The Court recently described a habeas petition as the appropriate procedure when the
legality of the custody or its duration is at issue. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489 (1973).
The appropriate habeas remedy is release from the unconstitutional incarceration. Id. at 484.
Section 1985 cases, on the other hand, are ones in which the prisoner challenges the conditions of
confinement. Id. at 489. Thus, in a § 1983 action a prisoner may not seek restoration of good
time credits since this remedy affects the duration of confinement, a claim cognizable only in a
habeas action. 418 U.S* at 554. A prisoner may, however, seek a declaratory judgment concerning the legality of the procedures in which good time is lost and damages for the lost good time.

418 U.S. at 554-55.
1372 U.S. at 19. The exhaustion requirement is a court-made procedure developed for the
sake of comity. Id. at 419-20. It does not include petitioning the United States Supreme Court

for writ of certiorari. Id. at 435-37.

"A § 1983 action does not require exhaustion at present. See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell,

418 U.S. 539 (1974); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1971). The Court, however, may be
moving toward an exhaustion requirement. See Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973).
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purview of the affirmative right of access. 85 It does seem unduly limiting,
however, since once the Bounds Court found that the Gilmore due process
right of access" encompassed more than just federal habeas corpus actions
there seems no particular reason, with the possible exception of cost considerations, to limit the scope of the right to only those constitutional claims
that can be raised by section 1983 or habeas corpus review. Consistent with
the reasoning in Bounds, however, it seems more appropriate to describe the
scope of the right broadly enough to include the assertion by a prisoner of at
least any fundamental right whether or not it is raised in a section 1983 action.87
The due process clause, which protects life, liberty, and property, 88 is
often described as governing a flexible concept whose parameters depend on
the context in which it is asserted.8 9 After Bounds, then, the issue with
respect to the right of prisoner access becomes whether the life, liberty, or
property interest asserted encompasses a fundamental right.90
"This, however, does not appear completely consistent with the reason that the Wolff
Court gave for including § 1983 actions within the Avery right of access in the first place. Wolff
v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 579 (1974).
"The Gilmore right requires states to expend funds to assist prisoner access. See note 26
sup',a & text accompanying.
'Certainly the Avery right of access, which prevents a state from impeding a prisoner from
reaching the court with claims, should reach well beyond habeas and § 1983 actions to include
any claim that a prisoner can lawfully make. As one court recently put it:
the right of free access to the courts is no less important in general civil matters than it
is in habeas and civil rights cases. While the decisions dealing with habeas and civil
rights actions have not reached this question, they have not foreclosed it. It is apparent
that the sphere of constitutional rights to be accorded to prison inmates has been increasing and that the logical extension of a holding that inmates must be permitted to
aid each other in the preparation of habeas and civil rights actions is that they should
also be permitted to help each other in general civil matters.... This Court is of the
opinion that such reasonable access should extend to general civil matters . . .
Corpus v. Estelle, 409 F. Supp. 1090, 1097 (S.D. Tex. 1975), affd, 551 F.2d 68 (5th Cir. 1977).
Accord, ABA REsouRcE CENTER, supra note 22, at 395.
"E.g., Note, The Right to Counsel in Civil Litigation, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 1322, 1330
(1966); Note, Towards a Constitutional Right to Counsel in Matrimonial Litigation, 4 FoRDHAm
URB. L.J. 515, 517 (1976); Counsel in Civil Cases, supra note 33, at 48.
"Danforth v. State Dept. of Health & Welfare, 303 A.2d 794, 797-98 (Me. 1973).
OIt is, perhaps, unnecessary to characterize the interest as a fundamental "right." See, e.g.,
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971). For examples of fundamental rights-or interests-see, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (divorce); Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618, 629-31 (1969) (travel). For an example of a right that is not fundamental, see,
e.g., Lindsey v. Normat, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972).

Some interests, like child custody, have been recognized by state courts as fundamental;
others have been considered fundamental by the United States Supreme Court. See Danforth v.
State Dept. of Health & Welfare, 303 A.2d 794 (Me. 1973); Comment, Constitutional LawFourteenth Amendment Due Process-Appointment of Counsel is Requiredfor Indigent Parents
Faced with a Dependency-Neglect Proceeding 6 RuT.-CAM. L.J. 623, 662-63 (1975); Note,
The Emerging Right of Legal Assistance for the Indigent in Civil Proceedings, 9 U. MICH. J. L.

REF. 554, 558 (1976). These cases find a constitutional right in parents to have custody of their
children. Cf Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1922) (right to rear children is due process
right and includes right to instruct them in foreign languages). Several state courts require the
appointment of counsel in such proceedings. E.g., Crist v. New Jersey Div'n of Youth and Family

INDIANA LWJOURNAL

[Vol. 53:207

The United States Supreme Court in Boddie v. Connecticut,91 for example, found a right of access9 to obtain a divorce by describing divorce as "the
adjustment of a fundamental human relationship"93 and finding that the
state "pre-empted" the procedures for achieving an adjustment of that relationship. 9 4 Thus under Boddie there is a right of access in civil cases at least
when the right asserted is fundamental and95 the procedures available for exercise of that right are state-controlled and exclusive.
Dealing first with the Boddie exclusivity requirement, there is persuasive
support for the proposition that since the state ultimately controls the ability
to enforce all rights, all that should be required to enforce a right of access
is the existence of a fundamental right. 96 It is also possible that in those cases
where a state court itself finds a fundamental right under state law that the
exclusivity factor would be irrelevant since this is a case where a state court is
telling its own state legislature to spend money. It would seem to be freer to
do this than the United States Supreme Court.9 7 Yet, even if exclusivity of
control must be shown, in the prisoner access cases it may be found in the
fact that the state in the incarceration of prisoners and in the establishment
and operation of its prisons controls the ability of an indigent prisoner to
reach the courts just as much as it does when it interposes a financial barrier
between the indigent and his ability to obtain a divorce. 98
Services, 135 N.J. Super. 573, 575, 343 A.2d 815, 817 (App. Div'n 1975); 303 A.2d at 797-99; In
re Ella B., 30 N.Y.2d 253, 285 N.E.2d 288, 334 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1972); State v. Jamison, 251 Ore.
114, 444 P.2d 15 (1968); Munkelwitz v. Hennepin County Welfare Dept., 280 Minn. 377, 159
N.W.2d 402 (1968); Chambers v. District Court, 261 Iowa 31, 152 N.W.2d 818 (1967). Note,
Right to Assigned Counsel at Welfare "Fair"Hearings, 40 ALB. L. REv. 676, 680 (1976); "Right"
to Counsel, supra note 33, at 995. States requiring the appointment of counsel in such proceedings are in the minority. Note, Parents Right to Counsel in Dependency and Neglect Proceedings, 49 IND. L.J. 167, 167-68 (1973).
91401 U.S. 371 (due process violation to assess fee of indigent seeking divorce).
"The right of access there meant that the state could not assess fees against indigent seeking divorce.
"1401 U.S. at 382. See United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 444-45 (1973).
94401 U.S. at 382; 409 U.S. at 441-42.
"It has been suggested, moreover, that the Boddie rationale should not be restricted to
cases in which fundamental rights are asserted. E.g., "Right" to Counsel, supra note 33, at 995.
Contra, Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932). See note 96 infra.
"1401 U.S. at 390-91 (Black, J., dissenting); Meltzer v. G. Buck Le Craw & Co., 402 U.S.
954, 955-56 (Black, J., dissenting); Goodpaster, supra note 5, at 244-63. See ABA RESoURcE
CENTER, supra note 22, at 368-69; Prisoners'Rights, supra note 22, at 290; Note, The Emerging
Right of Legal Assistance for the Indigent in Civil Proceedings, 9 U. MiCH. J. L. REF. 554, 564
(1976).
"The evolution in New Jersey of financing the right to education is an example of what appears to be an extreme involvement of a state court in state legislative expenditures. See Robinson v. Cahill. 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976, modified, 63 N.J.
196 (1973); Robinson v. Cahill, 69 N.J. 133, 351 A.2d 713 (1975) (corrected reprint of 67 N.J.
333, 339 A.2d 1973), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 913, vacated, 69 N.J. 449, 335 A.2d 129 (1975);
Robinson v. Cahill, 70 N.J. 155, 358 A.2d 457, modified, 70 N.J. 464, 360 A.2d 400 (1976); N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 54 A:9-28 (Supp. 1977). See, e.g., Payne, Delegation Doctrine in the Reform of
Local Government Law: The Case of Exclusionary Zoning, 29 RUTGERs L. REv. 803 (1976).
"Corpus v. Estelle, 409 F. Supp. 1090, 1096-97 (S.D. Tex. 1975), affd, 551 F.2d 68 (5th
Cir. 1977); ABA JOINT COMM., supra note 22, at 433; ABA RESOURCE CENTER, supra note 22, at
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The solution, it could be argued, would be for a prisoner to wait to bring
suit until released. But this neither solves the difficulty he faces as a defendant in a civil lawsuit nor considers the burden placed on the free defendant
waiting to be sued by the released prisoner. A person's posture as a plaintiff,
moreover, does not indicate that he is acting voluntarily or that the matter
does not warrant immediate attention.99 In any case, it is not always practical
for a prisoner to wait to bring suit since waiting oftentimes will decrease his
376-77. See Brief for Respondents at 8-9, Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977); Comment,
Resolving Civil Problems of Correctional Inmates, 1969 Wis. L. REV. 574, 577; Cardarelli &
Finkelstein, CorrectionalAdministrators Assess the Adequacy and Impact of Prison Legal Services Programs in the United States, 65 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 91, 96 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Cardarelli & Finkelstein].
It is the state, after all, that placed by deliberate choice its correctional facilities in areas
remote to population centers. E.g., S. CHANELS, THE OPEN PRISON, 53-54, 194-205 (1973); ABA
RESOURCE CENTER, supra note 22, at 370-71, 408-09. See U.S. BUREAU OF PRISONS, HANDBOOK OF
CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION 8 (1949); Jacob & Sharma, supra note
80, at 615; Prisoners' Rights, supra note 22, at 290. This distance makes access to the courts
more burdensome. One burden placed on access, for example, is that attorneys and law school
clinics may be less able because of the distance between their base of operations and the prison.
See United States ex rel. Stevenson v. Mancusi, 325 F. Supp. 1028, 1031 (W.D.N.Y. 1971). Personal interviews will probably occur infrequently. Yet personal interviews are extremely important
when representing prisoners. ABA RESOURCE CENTER, supra note 22, at 416, Bluth, supra note
17, at 67. Distance may also affect the quality of the legal assistance rendered. See e.g., ABA
RESOURCE CENTER, supra note 22, at 416.
Most states do not pay prisoner-employees a living wage. For information as to wages
presently paid prisoners see HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON CRIME, REFORM OF OUR CORRECTIONAL
SYSTEMS, H.R. REP. No. 93-329, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1973).The inability to earn a living
wage makes it more difficult for the prisoner to assert his rights without state assistance. ABA
JOINT COMM., supra note 22, at 433; ABA RESOURCE CENTER, supra note 22, at 368. The state
may also oppose the employment of prisoners (and, thus, payment of a living wage) by private
enterprise. See Letter from W. J. Estelle, Jr., Director of the Texas Department of Corrections to
J. R. Potuto (Dec. 29, 1976) [on file in Uniform Correc. Act Project Office, University of
Nebraska Law College, Lincoln, Neb.]. This economic picture is now changing; several
authorities are now proposing payment of a prevailing minimum or prevailing wage to prisoners.
E.g., UCA, supra note 72 § 4-408; ABA JOINT COMM., supra note 22, Std. 4.2, at 393; NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND OALS, CORRECTIONS, Std. 16.13
& Commentary at 583-84 (1973) [hereinafter cited at NAC]; PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON
PRISONER REHABILITATION, THE CRIMINAL OFFENDER-WHAT SHOULD BE DONE? 12 (1970);
Barnes & Teeters, Inmate Labor in the Correctional Program, in NEw HORIZONS IN
CRIMINOLOGY 741-42 (2d ed. 1963). A successful prevailing wage system is used in Sweden. N.
MORRIS & G. HAWKINS, THE HONEST POLITICIAN'S GUIDE TO CRIME CONTROL 131 (1970). See also
ECON, INC., ANALYSIS OF PRISON INDUSTRIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE, VI, STUDY OF

THE ECONOMIC AND REHABILITATIVE ASPECTS OF PRISON INDUSTRY (Sept. 24, 1976). There is also
movement to encourage private industry to employ prisoners. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 243.88
(Supp. 1976); UCA, supra note 72, at 388-89. For the present, however, it is true that prisoner
are not paid a living wage and that, therefore, their indigency derives, at least in part, from the
direct involvement of the state.
Other difficulties, see, e.g., Ortiz v. La Valle, 442 F.2d 912 (2d Cir. 1971), exist, including the possibility that the prisoner may not be allowed to appear in the action he brings. See,
e.g., Potter v. McCall, 433 F.2d 1087 (9th Cir. 1970). But see Saladino v. Federal Prison Indus.,
404 F. Supp. 1054 (D. Conn. 1975). The Uniform Corrections Act directs the court to determine
whether a prisoner should be ordered to appear in court. UCA supra note 72 § 4-115.
"See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376-77 (1971); Counsel in Civil Cases, supra
note 33, at 555.
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chances of success in the suit he brings.10 0 And even if waiting would not
harm his case, the applicable statute of limitations may prevent him from
10 1
waiting nonetheless.
Thus, incarceration itself, since it involves the state's exclusive control
over a prisoner, increases the burden on an indigent prisoner to gain access.
The state may therefore have a concomitantly increased duty to assist
prisoners in reaching the courts. 0 2 This in turn may aid in defining a fundamental right for purposes of finding a prisoner right of access and may result
in a right of access under the Boddie rationale that can be found in the
prison context when it would not be available to non-prisoner indigents asserting those same rights. 10 3
00

"E.g., Peterson v. Nadler, 452 F.2d 754, 756 (8th Cir. 1971) (per curiam) ("To delay the
action until plaintiff is released from prison could conceivably forever deny his securing presently
available evidence which he alleges is necessary to prove his claim ....
And to arbitrarily deny
even the bare opportunity to process his claim for an indefinite number of years could well
render the legal process meaningless for the plaintiff."). Accord, Delorme v. Pierce Freightlines
Co., 353 F. Supp. 258, 260 (D. Ore. 1973). But see Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 445 (Clark, J.,
dissenting); Peak v. United States, 353 U.S. 43 (1957). See also Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R.j
380 U.S. 424 (1965).
"'A few states have specific provisions tolling applicable statutes of limitations during a
prisoner's term of imprisonment. E.g., KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 413.310 (Bobbs-Merrill 1972);
CODE OF VA. § 8.01-229.A3 (1977) (limited to claims against his committee. See Miss. CODE
ANN. § 15-1-57 (1972). Other states toll the statute of limitations for a prisoner only for a
specified period of time; the time period means that a prisoner serving a longer sentence is not
covered during his full term of imprisonment. E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-515 (1977) (for a
term less than life there is an eight-year limit). More often, however, tolling only occurs if the
cause of action accrues while the prisoner is incarcerated. E.g., Aiuz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-502
(West Supp. 1977); CAL. CIv. PRoc. CODE § 352 (West Supp. 1977) (applies to a term less than
life); COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-80-116 (Supp. 1976); IDAHO CODE § 5-230 (Supp. 1977) (for a term
less than life there is a 6-year limit); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 83 § 22 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977); ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14 § 853 (West Supp. 1977); ANN. LAWS OF MASS. ch. 260 § 7 (Michie
1968); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 600.5851 (West Supp. 1977-1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
541.15 (West Supp. 1977) (applies to a term less than life; NaB. REv. STAT. § 25-213 (Reissue
1975) (there is a twenty-year limit); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 893.33 (West 1966) (for a term less than
life there is a 5-year limit). Moreover, in the absence of a tolling statute courts have refused to
imply a tolling of the statute of limitations. E.g., Battle v. Lawson, 352 F. Supp. 156, 158 (W.D.
Okla. 1972); Williams v. Hollins, 428 F.2d 1221, 1221-22 (6th Cir. 1970). But cf. Kaiser v.
Cahn, 510 F.2d 282 (2d Cir. 1974).
1"It is possible to argue, of course, that it is the prisoner by committing the crime, and not
the state, that is responsible for the incarceration and the further restrictions that attend on it
and that, therefore, the state is under no greater duty to aid the indigent prisoner than to aid indigents generally. This argument, however, applies equally well at least to the section 1983 action. It hindered neither the Wolff nor Bounds Court from requiring that the state provide
assistance.
"3'See, ABA JOINT COMMrIrEE. supra Note 22, at 433. Of course, thus defined the right will
cost more to implement. And these potential costs may well dictate caution to a court attempting
to determine the constitutional scope of the right. Yet, if the right is constitutionally mandated
the cost to implement it will be irrelevant since "constitutional requirements are not, in this day,
to be measured or limited by dollar considerations.
... Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 580
(8th Cir. 1968) (Blackman, J.). Cf. James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128, 141-42 (1972) (Kansas statute
for recovering defense fees from indigent defendents violates equal protection because no protective exemptions available); Meltzer v. C. Buck Le Cra & Co., 402 U.S. 954, 956 (1971) (Black,
J., dissenting to denial of certiorori) (poverty cases). There is some evidence that even the cost of
full legal survices programs affording counsel to all indigents may not be prohibitive. Counsel in
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If the possibility exists that the exclusive control of the state over the
prisoner might broaden the class of fundamental actions for which prisoner
access must be assured, it seems even more necessary to develop a standard
for determining what constitutes a fundamental right in the prison context.
The court in Bounds, however, failed to provide such a standard.
One test for determining whether a right is fundamental is, of course,
whether appointment of counsel is required. It has been argued that to have
a meaningful due process civil hearing the assistance of counsel is as crucial
as in a criminal trial since the procedures can be just as complex 04 and the
consequences equally severe. 105 Thus it is argued that counsel should be appointed for indigents in all civil proceedings just as counsel is appointed for
indigents in criminal trials. 10 6 Although there is not now a due process right
to counsel in civil proceedings generally 0 7 for some hearings due process does
indeed require the appointment of counsel. 108
Ciil Cases, supra note 34, at 551. See also Utton, The British Legal Aid System, 76 YALE L.J.
371 (1967); Schweinburg, Legal Assistance Abroad, 17 U. CHI. L. REV. 270, 280-91 (1950).
04
' E.g., Note, The Right To Counsel in Civil Litigation, 66 CoLUM. L. REv. 1322, 1322-23,
1331 (1966); Note, Emerging Right of Legal Assistance for the Indigent in Civil Proceedings, 9
U. MicH. J. L. REF. 554, 554-58 (1976); Counsel in Civil Cases, supra note 33, at 548. Cf. Powell
v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). It has been argued that the civil litigant at trial has more need
of the assistance of counsel than the criminal defendant on appeal. E.g., Counsel in Civil Cases,
supra note 33, at 550. See "Right" to Counsel, supra note 33, at 993. Cf. Note, right to Aid in
Addition to Counselfor Indigent CriminalDefendants, 47 MINN. L. REv. 1054, 1074-75 (1963).
" 5'Danforth v. State Dept. of Health & Welfare, 303 A.2d 794, 800 (Me. 1973); Note, Right
to Counsel in Civil Litigation, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 1322, 1332-33 (1969); 6 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 623,
662 (1975); Note, The Emerging Right of Legal Assistance for the Indigent in Civil Proceedings,
9 U. MicH. J. L. REF. 554, 558 (1976). See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576 (1975) ("as long as
a property deprivation is not de minimus, its gravity is irrelevant to the question whether account
must be taken of the Due Process clause."); Goodpaster, supra note 5, at 248; Counsel in Civil
Cases, supra note 33, at 550.
osSee Meltzer v. G. Buck LeCraw & Co., 402 U.S. 954, 959 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting);
"Right" to Counsel, supra note 33, at 994; Note, The EmergingRight of Legal.Assistancefor the
Indigent in Civil Proceedings, 9 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 554, 554-57 (1976); Counsel in Civil Cases,
supra note 33, at 545-49. Historically, counsel was appointed for indigents in civil proceedings; it
was the criminal defendant who was unassisted at trial. See, e.g., Note, The Right to Counsel in
Civil Litigation, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 1322, 1327-30 (1966); Note, The Emerging Right of Legal
Assistancefor the Indigent in Civil Proceedings, 9 U. MIcH. J. L. REF. 554, 554 (1976).
"'5 Peterson v. Nadler, 452 F.2d 754, 757 (8th Cir. 1971) (per curiam); "Right" to Counsel,
supra note 33, at 989; Counsel in Civil Cases, supra note 33, at 545; Note, The Emerging Right
of Legal Assistancefor the Indigent in Civil Proceedings, 9 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 554 (1976). See,
e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare termination hearing). Accord, Matter of
Brown v. Lavine, 37 N.Y.2d 317, 333 N.E.2d 374, 372 N.Y.S.2d 75 (1975). See Note, Right to
Assigned Counsel at Welfare "Fair"Hearings, 40 ALB. L. REV. 676, 677 (1976).
108See Note, The Emerging Right of Legal Assistance for the Indigent in Civil Proceedings,
9 U. MicH. J. L. REF. 554, 558 (1976). Cf Note, PrisonerAssistance, supra note 38, at 889. The
United States Supreme Court has required the appointment of counsel at juvenile proceedings in
which a loss of liberty may result. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967). See Note, Parents' Right to
Counsel in Dependency and Neglect Proceedings, 49 IND. L.J. 167, 169 (1973). These proceedings are civil in nature. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966). The Court has also
required the appointment of counsel at probation and parole revocation hearings when it is called for in the interests of fundamental fairness in the particular case. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411
U.S. 778, 789-90 (1973). See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). Again, these proceedings
are civil in nature. Id. There is no right to counsel at a prison disciplinary hearing, however,
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If the due process necessity for appointment of counsel is any test, then,
there are civil proceedings in which the rights asserted are as fundamental as
those in a criminal trial-or those that are asserted in a habeas corpus or section 1983 action. It is clear, of course, that in those cases in which a prisoner
is provided the assistance of counsel the legal services alternative under the
Bounds right of access has been met.109 But what of other civil cases in which
neither the state nor the United States has found a due process right to an attorney1 but in which the interest asserted is a liberty or property interest requiring due process protection?"' These cases are relevant because, although
there is likewise no due process right to an attorney when filing a section 1983
action" 2' or when petitioning for writ of habeas corpus," 3 the Court in
Bounds nonetheless found that the importance of the substantive claims involved in those actions required affirmative action on the part of the state.
Thus, the fact that the right asserted is not so important as to require the appointment of counsel may make it an even clearer case for attachment of the
11 4
right of prisoner access.
even though the imposition of good time loss increases the time served. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
U.S. 539 (1974). Cf. Montayne v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236 (1976); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215
(1976); Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25 (1976). The Court has intimated that counsel must be
appointed in proceedings in which the privilege against self-incrimination may need to be
asserted to avoid the possibility of later criminal prosecution. Maness v. Meyers. 419 U.S. 449,
466 (1975) (assertion of privilege "often depends upon legal advice from someone who is trained
and skilled in the subject matter, and who may offer a more objective opinion. A layman may
not be aware of the precise scope, the nuances, and boundaries of his Fifth Amendment
privilege. It is not a self-executing mechanism; it can be affirmatively waived, or lost by not
asserting it in a timely fashion."). See Note, Right to Assigned Counsel at Welfare "Fair"Hearings, 40 ALB. L. REv. 676, 680 (1976); "Right" to Counsel, supra note 33, at 995. The privilege
may be asserted in a civil proceeding. See, e.g., Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449 (1975); Kastigar
v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444 (1972); Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 71 (1973). Its assertion is complicated by the fact that a defendant risks punishment for contempt if an appellate
court later determines that the privilege, although asserted in good faith, did not cover the transaction at issue. See, e.g., United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 532-33 (1971). For cases in which
state courts have required the appointment of counsel for civil matters see note 90 supra.
"' 5As to whether this means that the state is under no obligation to provide law libraries, see
note 199 infra & text accompanying.
"0 There can, of course, exist statutory authority to appoint counsel in civil cases. E.g., 28
U.S.C. § 1915 (1970); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 1102(a) (McKinney 1976): ARK. STAT. ANN. §
27-401 to -403 (1962). See Peterson v. Nadier, 452 F.2d 754, 757 (8th Cir. 1971); "Right" to
Counsel, supra note 33, at 998-99. There is also power in the courts to do so in appropriate
cases. See, e.g., In re Smiley, 36 N.Y.2d 433, 330 N.E.2d 53, 369 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1975); "Right"
to Counsel, supra note 33, at 998-99; Note, The Emerging Right of Legal Assistance for the Indigent in Civil Proceedings, 9 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 554, 567 (1976).
"'For cases in which such an interest is recognized, see, e.g., Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341
(1976) (dismissal of policeman); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (dismissal of teacher);
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (suspension of student); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972)
(property repossession). An interest in one's reputation was recently held to be neither a due process liberty nor property interest. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
1"There is presently no constitutional right under the seventh amendment for appointment
of counsel in civil actions.
"'See
cases cited at notes 166, 167 & 170.
4
1 1t would seem, in fact, that those rights that are so fundamental as to require the appointment of counsel cannot be encompassed by the right of access rationale. On the one hand,
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There is, as yet, no clear indication from the Court, however, as to
whether-and which-civil cases will give rise to a right of access for
prisoners broader than that afforded generally to the citizens. It is nonetheless
safe to assert that whenever under the Boddie test, a "fundamental human
relationship"' Is is found to give rise to a right of access, prisoners will be entitled to an exercise of that right that is at least equivalent to that afforded
free citizens. This will hold true whether the fundamental right is found to
exist by the Supreme Court or by a state court since it is, after all, the state
that is footing the bill.
Unless and until the time arrives that civil legal problems, at least when
of constitutional magnitude, are included within the Bounds right of access a
state may, of course, choose not to provide prisoners with legal services or access to law books and other legal materials adequate to research civil legal
problems. Yet even if the constitutional scope of the right is expressly found
not to include an affirmative duty to assist prisoners in pursuing civil legal
claims, this should not end the matter for a state considering the appropriate
scope of its prison legal services and library system. For surely there can be
and frequently is a difference between constitutional minimum standards-and
what is dictated by sound policy. 116 And in this case there are very strong
policy arguments that can be made in favor of providing prisoners with comprehensive legal services 7 and law libraries.
if there is a constitutional right to the appointment of counsel if indigent then the law library
alternative, although adequate to satisfy the Bounds right of access, could never satisfy that independent constitutional right to counsel. On the other hand, if a prisoner already had a constitutional right to the appointment of counsel if indigent then the Bounds right of access need
never have developed.
""See note 94 supra.
"'On the difference between what the Constitution requires and what, although perhaps
wise policy, is not required by the Constitution, see Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729-30
(1963); Jones v. North Carolina Prisoner's Labor Union, Inc., 97 S.Ct. 2532, 2544 (1977)
(Burger, C.J., concurring).
117There are many considerations involved in providing legal services to prisoners. One question is whether a program functions better inside or outside the department of corrections. Compare, e.g., Comment, Resolving Civil Problems of CorrectionalInmates, 1969 Wis. L. REy. 574,
585-86 (resident legal counsel advised) and Inmate Legal Services, supra note 22, at 528-30 (resident legal counsel advised) with Krause, A Lawyer Looks at Writ-Writing, 56 CALIF. L. Rxv.
371, 377 (1968) (public defender should handle post-conviction relief proceedings) and ABA
RESOURCE CENTER. supra note 22, at 407 (non-resident legal counsel advised). Law College prison
projects have also engendered both criticsm and plaudits. See e.g., ABA RESOURCE CENTER.
supra note 22, at 399-403. Another question is whether such programs can or should attempt to
eliminate jailhouse lawyers. See, e.g., Bluth, supra note 17, at 68-80; Brierley, The Legal Controversy as it Relates to CorrectionalInstitutes-A Prison Administrator's View, 16 VILL. L. Rv.
1070, 1075 (1971); Champagne & Haas, supra note 15, at 297; Wexler, supra note 22, at 153-54.
More than 80% of correctional administrators believe that prisoner legal services are useful. See
ABA JOINT COMM.. supra note 22, at 430. They are often critical, however, of the particular
lawyers who handle prisoner cases. See Cardarelli & Finkelstein, supra note 98, at 100. It seems
clear that, properly administered, legal services programs will aid the courts as well as prisoners
since reduced court time should result if prisoners receive such assistance. See, e.g., United States
v. Simpson, 436 F.2d 162, 167 (D.C. Cir. 1970). There is, thus, a societal interest in providing
legal services. See, e.g., Cardarelli & Finkelstein, supra note 98, at 95; Werner, supra note 26, at
268. See Jacob & Sharma, supra note 80, at 519.
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It is very clear that unresolved legal problems create worry and tension
among prisoners. 118 Worry and tension can only exascerbate the strain placed
on prisoners by the prison setting itself." 9 Thus, anything that can be done to
minimize the tension should be encouraged as a way to avoid violence and
other problems at the prisons. 120 Civil legal problem areas cover a wide range
of subjects and include domestic relations,' 2' financial 122 or probate 23 matters, recovery of personal property, 24 preconfinement contract and tort
claims, 2 1 and even patent, admiralty, and tax problems. 26 Since their
27
number constitutes approximately one-third of all prisoner legal problems
these civil legal problems are significant enough to impact on the overall
prison environment. Providing legal services and law libraries and thus
alleviating some of the tensions caused by these problems is all to the good;
and a decision to do so represents a wise policy choice by a state. 128 And
evidence, if evidence is needed, that it is possible for a state to handle these

"'E.g., ABA RESOURCE CENTER. supra note 22, at 377; Cardarelli & Finkelstein, supra note
98, at 95; Comment. Resolving Civil Problems of CorrectionalInmates, 1969 WIs. L. REV. 574,
577.
"'See, e.g., NAC, supra note 98, at Std 2.14 & Commentary, p. 56-57; ABA JOINT COMM.
supra note 22, at 433. Cf. THE OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE SPECIAL COM?&N. ON
ATTICA. ATI-rCA. ch. 2 (1972).

12See UCA, supra note 72, at 101-04; ABA JOINT COMM.. supra note 22, at 574-82.
12'Souza Travisono, 498 F.2d 1120, 1124 (1st Cir. 1974); ABA REsOURCE CENTER. supra
note 22, at 395; Bluth, supra note 17, at 74; Jacob & Sharma, supra note 80, at 578; Reeves,
supra note 26, at 142; Werner, Law Library Service to Prisoners-The Responsibility of Nonprison Libraries, 63 L. LIB. J. 231, 231 (1970); Comment, Resolving Civil Problems of Correctional Inmates, 1969 Wis. L. REv. 574, 574-75.
"'See Souza v. Travisono 498 F.2d 1120, 1124 (1st Cir. 1974); Flannery & Robbins, The
Misunderstood Pro Se Litigant: More than a Pawn in the Game, 41 BROOKLYN L. REV. 769, 772
(1975); Jacob & Sharma, supra note 80, at 578; Werner, Law Library Service to Prisoners-The
Responsibility of Nonprison Libraries, 63 LAW La1. J. 231, 231 (1970).
"'1498 F.2d at 1124; Bluth, supra note 17, at 74.
"'1ABA RESOURCE CENTER, supra note 22, at 377; Bluth, supra note 17, at 63; Reeves supra
note 26, at 142.
"'Bluth, supra note 17, at 74.
"'Flannery & Robbins, The Misunderstood Pro Se Litigant: More than a Pawn in the
Game, 41 BROOKLYN L. REv. 769, 772 (1975).
"2'Bluth, supra note 17, at 74; ABA RESOURCE CENTER. supra, note 22, at 383 (30%);
Alpert, Prisoners'Right of Access to Courts: Planningfor Legal Aid, 51 WASH. L. REV. 653, 673
(1976) (37%). The estimates do not include petitions for post-conviction relief.
"'Most commentators advise that prison legal services include civil matters. E.g., ABA
JOINT COMM., supra note 22, Std. 2.2.(c), at 433; NAC, supra note 98, § 2.2; Prisoners'Rights,
supra note 22, at 290. See generally notes 1-8 supra. Cf. UCA, supra note 72, (legal assistance
when prisoner is a defendant or "may be bound by a proceeding he did not initiate"). The need
for civil legal assistance to indigents in general has been recognized as a societal problem. ABA
JOINT COMM., supra note 22, at 433; Counsel in Civil Cases, supra note 33, at 545-46. Society is
now attempting to meet that need. See Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974, Pub. L. 83-355,
88 Stat. 378 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2996-2961. It could be argued that legal services for
prisoners should be no better than what is available to indigents generally. But there is strong
support for the proposition that prisoner legal needs are more serious by virture of their incarceration and that, thus, the state has a concomittantly increased responsibility to provide
assistance. See note 102 supra & text accompanying.
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problems can be found in the fact that several legal service systems already
routinely handle civil legal matters for prisoners.129 But whatever the eventual
constitutional scope, in terms of subject matter, of the right of prisoner access
and whatever a state as a matter of policy chooses to provide, the Bounds
right at present only requires states to provide either law libraries or legal
assistance-and the choice as to which is provided is left to the states. Thus
under Bounds a prisoner needing legal materials has an enforceable right only in the absence of an alternative and adequate means of access to the
courts. 5 0 Access to legal materials, however, may well be a fundamental5
and indefeasible- due process right in itself.1 '

LAW LIBRARY RIGHT ONLY IN THE ALTERNATIVE:
IS IT CONSTITUTIONALLY SUFFICIENT?

The Pro Se Defendant
A defendant in a criminal trial has a constitutional right to the assistance
of counsel 13 2 if there is the possibility of incarceration upon conviction.' 33 Until recently assistance of counsel was considered essential to a fair trial
because, in addition to the handicap most defendants carry of little or no
2

1 'See, e.g., ABA RESOURCE CENTER. supra note 22, at 405-06 (describing Texas,
Washington, and Wisconsin programs); Alpert, Prisoners' Right of Access to Courts: Planning
for Legal Aid, 51 WASH. L. REV. 653, 673 (1976) (describing Washington program); Brief for
Respondents, Exhibit B, Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977) (describing Baltimore, Chicago,
Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Minnesota, Montanna, New York, Texas, and
Washington programs). Final Report, Consortium of States to Furnish Legal Counsel to Prisoners
(Sept. 21, 1976) (LEAA grant 75-DF-99-0013) (describing Florida, Georgia, Kansas, South
Carolina, and Vermont programs).
'Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 829 (1977).
1
S5ee Prisoners' Rights, ;tupra note 22, at 297. See, e.g., Kamisar, The Right to Counsel
and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Dialogue on "the Most Pervasive Right" of an Accused, 30
U. CHi. L. Rxv. 1, 33 (1962). Most commentators recommend establishment of adequate law
libraries even if legal services are provided. See, e.g., ABA JOINT CoMM., supra note 22, at
426142; UCA, supra note 72, at 316-320; NAC, supra note 115, Std. 2.3 at 29-30; Poe, A Spark
of Hope for Prisoners, 66 LAw LIB. J. 59 (1973).
5t
' The right to counsel is found in the sixth amendment. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,
462 (1938). It requires the appointment of counsel for indigent defendants. Gideon v. Wainwright 372 U.S. 335 (1963). The right to counsel may attach at pretrial. Hamilton v. Alabama,
368 U.S. 52, 55 (1961) (arraignment); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 60 (1963) (preliminary
hearing); Miranda v. Arizona, 584 U.S. 436 (1966) (custodial interrogation or when suspect is
focus of investigation); Hawk v. Olsen, 326 U.S. 271, 278 (1945) (preparation for trial); United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236-37 (1967) (post-indictment lineup). But see Kirby v. Illinois,
406 U.S. 682, 688-89 (1972) (the right to counsel does not attach at identification prior to initiation of adversary process). The right to be represented by counsel does not, however, encompass
all pretrial proceedings. See People v. Inniello, 21 N.Y.2d 418, 423-25, 235 N.E.2d 439, 442-44,
288 N.Y.S.2d
462 (1968) (grand jury).
5
" Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). A distinction is sometimes made between a
criminal proceeding and other proceedings in which incarceration or extended incarceration may
result. See cases and authorities cited at note 108 supra.
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education and an inability to articulate, 13' the defendant would also have to
contend with a lack of legal expertise which would make him unable to comprehend the intricacies of trial procedure and the substantive law. 135 Thus the
Supreme Court over time progressed to its present position that every criminal
defendant is entitled to the assistance of counsel because without this
assistance a defendant would be effectively prevented from presenting his case
136
in court.
In Faretta v. California'" the Supreme Court, while not denying that a
pro se defendant would find himself severely disadvantaged at trial, 3 8 never54
' E.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); People v. Rhinehart, 9 Cal. 3d 139, 507
P.2d 642, 107 Cal. Rptr. 34 (1973). See Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 496-97 (1969) (Douglas,
J., concurring); A Jailhouse Lawyer's View, supra note 17, at 139; Jacob & Shrama, supra note
80, at 508. Larsen, supra note 22, at 352; Zeigler & Hermann, supra note 22, at 181-82.
135

The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman
has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad.
He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be
put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or
evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and
knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one. He
requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him.
287 U.S. at 68-69. Accord, Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938).
156304 U.S. at 462-63; 287 U.S. at 68-69; Kamisar, The Right to Counsel and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Dialogue on "the Most Pervasive Right" of an Accused, 30 U. CHI. L.
Rav. 1 (1962); Comment, Farettav. Calfornia:An Examination of Its ProceduralDeficiencies, 7
COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. Rav. 553, 567 (1975); Note, The Right to Defend Pro Se-Farettav.
California: Due Process and Beyond, 11 U. TULSA L.J. 365, 366 (1976); Note, TheJailed Pro Se
Defendant and The Right to PrepareA Defense, 86 YALE L.J. 292, 292 (1976). [hereinafter cited
as The Jailed Pro Se Defendant].
57
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
111422 U.S. at 834. It would be extremely difficult to deny that a pro se defendant would be
disadvantaged. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). There is, in any case, some empirical evidence to support the fact that a defendant fares better at trial when assisted by
counsel. See Nagel, Effects of Alternative Types of Counsel on Criminal Procedure Treatment,
48 IND. L.J. 404, 409 (1973) (results of survey showed 27% of represented defendants were acquitted; 0% of pro se defendants were acquitted). Assistance of counsel may also be helpful in
obtaining release on bond (See id. at 408) and in obtaining a suspended sentence or probation.
See id. at 410. The assistance of counsel may not be as useful in obtaining a suspended sentence
or probation under a presumptive or flat sentencing scheme. For examples of presumptive
sentencing schemes, see UCA §§ 3-111 to 3-115, supra note 72; TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK
FORCE ON SENTENCING. FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT (1976). For examples of flat sentencing
schemes, see, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A (Supp. 1975). Such schemes limit judicial sentencing
discretion and would thus limit an attorney's ability to obtain a lesser sentence for his client. For
an illustration of the limitations on sentencing discretion, see UCA, supra note 72. Under the
Act, the legislature classifies offenses and designates the maximum sentence for each class of offenses. Id. § 3-103. The Sentencing Commission is to construct a guideline, or presumptive
sentence, for each offense within a class; the punishment is to be proportionate to the seriousness
of the offense with the most serious offenses assigned a presumptive sentence equal to the maximum sentence allowed for that class of offense. See id. § 3-112. The guidelines are to be based
on the underlying facts of the offense and not the offense charged. Id. § 3-114. Thus, if a lawyer
succeeded in having the charge reduced to an offense in a class of offenses carrying a lesser
statutory maximum term, the sentence required under the guideline might very well require imposition of the maximum term for an offense of that class.
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theless found that a defendant has the constitutional right to proceed pro se
if he so chooses.1 9 The Court cited the English140 and American' 4' common
law traditions," 42 the existence of the right in most state constitutions, 43 its
enactment as a federal statutory right,' 44 and the language of the sixth
amendment,' 4" as supporting the "nearly universal conviction on the part of
our people as well as our courts"'" 6 that there is a constitutional right to conduct a pro se defense. 47 The Court recognized the self-evident truth that in
defending pro se the defendant was probably trading away the effective
assistance of counsel that a trained professional could bring to the courtroom.' 4" This effective assistance of counsel is today often described as requir-

ing counsel to be reasonably likely to provide-and to, in fact, provideadequate legal assistance.149 It is clear that it is this kind of assistance that
the pro se defendant trades away since the pro se defendant would most likely
not be reasonably likely to provide himself adequate legal assistance. 50 A
1"'422 U.S. at 836.
1'Id. at 821-26.
111id. at 826-30.
"'2But see id. at 843-44 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("We are well reminded that this Court
once employed an exhaustive analysis of English and colonial practices regarding the right to
counsel to justify the conclusion that it was fundamental to a fair trial and, less than 10 years
later, used essentially the same material to conclude that it was not.").
"'Id. at 813-14.
14'18 U.S.C. § 1654 (1970).
14See note 37 supra. But see 422 U.S. at 844 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (questioning the
need for a federal statute if the sixth amendment already protected the pro se right).
1"'422 U.S. at 817.
1471d. at 836.
141Id. at 834. See note 158 supra. When represented by counsel effective assistance includes
a discussion with the client of trial strategies and tactical choices, an investigation of the factual
and legal issues relevant to making a case for the defense, and acting promptly to advise the
defendant of his rights and to preserve those rights by appropriate action. ABA PROJECT ON MINMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE. STANDARDS RELATING TO PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES §

7.3 (App'd Draft 1968). See, e.g, United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1203 (D.C. Cir.
1973), modified after remand, 45 U.S.L.W. 2216 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 19, 1976); Coles v Peyton, 389
F.2d 224, 226 (4th cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849 (1968).
14"'See Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 696 (6th Cir. 1974); Stone. Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel and Post-Conviction Relief in Criminal Cases: Changing Standards and
Practical Consequences, 7 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 427, 431 (1975). See, e.g., United
States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 423 U.S. 876 (1975);
Herring v. Estelle. 491 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197 (D.C.
Cir. 1973), modified after remand, 45 U.S.L.W. 2216 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 19, 1976); Moore v.
United States, 432 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1970); Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 849 (1968); MacKenna v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 592 (5th Cir.), modified, 289 F.2d 928
(5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 877 (1961); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
See Note, Effective Assistance of Counsel: A ConstitutionalRight in Transition, 10 VAL. U. L.
REV. 509, 531 (1976).
"'The pro se defendant, then, may not obtain reversal based on his own lack of professional
competence, at least when the trial is not a complete "mockery of justice." This "mockery of
justice" standard is also a standard that is used to test the effectiveness of counsel. E.g., United
States v. Jones, 512 F.2d 347, 349 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Yanishefsky, 500 F.2d 1327,
1333 (2d Cir. 1974); Dunker v. Vinzant, 505 F.2d 503 (1st Cir. 1974); McQueen v. Swenson, 498
F.2d 207 (8th Cir. 1974); Lorraine v. United States, 444 F.2d 1, 2 (10th Cir. 1971); Diggs v.
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represented defendant is entitled to a new trial if his counsel fails to meet this
test; a pro se defendant should not be entitled to a new trial on these grounds
since to thus evaluate his pro se defense would invariably give him two bites
at the trial apple.' 5 '
The test for what makes an effective counsel clearly suggests one
necessary factor in the pro se fight-the right, and need, to prepare.
Preparation is so crucial for an attorney that the question whether there was
adequate preparation is the crux of most allegations of ineffective assistance
of counsel.1 5 2 Thus, if the right to proceed pro se means anything, it must encompass the due process right, even for an incarcerated pro se defendant, to
prepare. 53 As has been said,
an adequate opportunity to prepare is a fundamental component of due process, guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Put another way,
the state cannot prevent a jailed pro se defendant from preparing his defense
merely because he has chosen to exercise his constitutional right of selfrepresentation.5 4
Welch, 148 F.2d 667, 669 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 889 (1945). Cf. Wainwright v.
Sykes, 97 S.Ct. 2497, (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting). It is perhaps most often applied in cases
where the defendant retains his own attorney and, therefore, presumably suffers the consequences
of his choice. E.g., Hamilton v. Wilkinson, 271 F.2d 278 (5th Cir. 1959) (per curiam); Anderson
v. Bannan, 250 F.2d 654 (6th Cir. 1958) (per curiam); People v. Vitale, 3 Ill. 2d 99, 119 N.E.2d
784 (1954). See, e.g., Note, Effective Assistance of Counsel, 49 VA. L. REV. 1531, 1532-33
(1963). In deciding to defend pro se, the defendant, in essence, has retained himself.
It is not even clear whether the "mockery of justice" test, as applied in cases where defendant was represented by counsel, could apply to the situation where the pro se defendant elects,
in the face of warnings about his potential difficulties at trial, to poceed without counsel. It
would seem that if a pro se defense becomes a mockery of justice then he should never have been
permitted to proceed pro se in the first place. In that case it would seem that a mockery of
justice results wl-enever the defendant isincapable of meeting the Faretta requirement of making
a knowing and intelligent choice. 422 U.S. at 807.
1"1422 U.S. at 834-35 n.46.
"'See United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1203 (D.C. Cir. 1973), modified after remand, 45 U.S.L.W. 2216 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 19, 1976); Stone, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and
Post-Conviction Relief in Criminal Cases: Changing Standards and Practical Consequences, 7
COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REv. 427, 439 (1975); Note, Effective Assistance of Counsel, 49 VA.
L. REV. 1531, 1543 (1963); The Jailed Pro Se Defendant, supra note 136, at 294. See also Martinez Rodriquez v. Jimenez, 409 F. Supp. 582, 594 (D.P.R.), affd on other grounds, 551 F.2d
877 (1977); Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224, 226 (4h Cir.), cert. denied, 595 U.S. 849 (1968); People v. Ibarra, 60 Cal. 2d 460, 386 P.2d 487, 34 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1963).
"'See Martinez Rodriquez v. Jiminez, 409 F. Supp. 582, 594 (D.P.R.), affd on other
grounds 551 F.2d 877 (1977); The Jailed Pro Se Defendant, supra note 145, at 296-306. See
Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
45, 59 (1932); Kamisar, The Right to Counsel and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Dialogue on
"the Most Pervasive Right" of an Accused, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 33 (1962); Comment, Prisoners'
Right to Access to Legal Material, 8 GONZ. L. REv. 340, 353 (1973). Cf ABA RESOURCE CENTER.
supra note 16, at 374. See note 140 supra. Contra, Lee v. Stynchcombe, 347 F. Supp. 1076, 1079
(N.D. Ga. 1972); Walle v. Sigler, 329 F. Supp. 1278, 1282 (D. Neb. 1971), affd, 456 F.2d 1153
(8th Cir. 1972); People v. Noah, 5 Cal. 3d 469, 479, 487 P.2d 1009, 1015-16, 96 Cal. Rptr. 441,
447-48 (1971); People v. Pearson, 150 Cal. App. 2d 811, 311 P.2d 142, 144 (public defender sat
with defendants during trial).
"4 TheJailed Pro Se Defendant, supra note 156, at 296. Cf Adams v. United States ex rel.
McCann 317 U.S. 269 (1942); 409 F. Supp. 582, 594; ABA RESOURCE CENTER. supra note 22, at
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Preparation means having adequate time in which to work and having
materials available to do the legal research necessary to prepare the defense.
If the result were otherwise, the incarcerated pro se defendant would be
foreclosed from even attempting to prepare an adequate defense or to learn
enough trial procedure so that he can "play with the same ground rules that
anybody plays."155 Not to allow the pro se incarcerated defendant to prepare
would also have the result of placing him at a disadvantage in relation to an
unincarcerated pro se defendant since the unincarcerated defendant does
158
This result would be most unfortunate;
have the opportunity to prepare.
both defendants are, after all, presumptively innocent and the incarceration
pretrial of one and not the other may relate as much to indigence as to any
security risk factor.157
Since it is clear that the pro se right acclaimed by the Faretta Court cannot be met if access to legal materials is cut off by virtue of the defendant's
incarceration pretrial or during trial, as a due process right access to legal
5 s
It is error
materials must be provided to the pro se incarcerated defendant.
to conclude, therefore, that representation by an attorney, certainly adequate
374; Comment, The Pro Se Defendant: No Right to Say No, 23 EMORY L.J. 523, 530-31 (1974);
Note, Effective Assistance of Counsel: A ConstitutionalRight in Transition, 10 VAL. U. L. REV.
509, 543 (1976).
11s422 U.S. at 808 n.2 The Court quoted with favor the trial judge's admonition to Faretta
that Faretta would receive no special favors and would be held to the same standards as an attorney. Judges commonly assert that no favors will be afforded pro se defendants. E.g. Minor v.
United States, 375 F.2d 170, 172-73 (8th CIr.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 882 (1967); Carothers v.
Follette, 314 F. Supp. 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Note, The Right to Defend Pro Se: Faretta v.
Caifornia and Beyond, 40 ALB. L. REv. 423, 442 (1976). Quaere, however, whether courts will
be able to live up to this philosophy. See, e.g., The Jailed Pro Se Defendant, supra note 136, at
312-13.
Rights, supra note 22, at 300.
'"Prisoners'
7
16 The bail system is intended to assure the presence of a defendant at trial. See Stack v.
Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951). It sometimes results, however, in the incarceration of indigent defendants who cannot make bail. See, e.g., Nagel, Effects of Alternative Types of Counsel on
Criminal Procedure Treatment, 48 IND. L.J. 404, 408 (1973); Foote, The Coming Constitutional
Crisis in Bail (pts. 1 & 2) 113 U. PA. L. REV. 959, 1125 (1965). The Federal Bail Reform Act, 18
U.S.C. § 3146 (1970), is an attempt to correct this. See Pugh v. Rainwater, 21 Cr. L. R. 2497
Aug. 22, 1977).
"'Further support for the proposition that a pro se defendant must be allowed to prepare
can be found in the warnings given to a potential pro se defendant. The list of consequences attendant upon his choice to proceed pro se does not include the warning that, if incarcerated
pretrial, he is foregoing an opportunity to prepare a case. See, e.g., 422 U.S. at 808 n.2,
835-836; Note, The Right to Defend Pro Se-Farettav. California:Due Process and Beyond, 11
U. TULSA L.J. 365, 385-90 (1976).
There is no consensus as to whether a defendant should be informed of his right to proceed
pro se. E.g., Comment, The Pro Se Defendant: No Right to Say No, 23 EMORY L.J. 523, (1974).
Several authorities recommend that the waiver of counsel be made in consultation with an attorney. E.g., ABA PROJEcr ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING
TO PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES § 7.3 (App'd Draft 1968). The American Bar Association also
recommends renewing the offer of counsel to pro se defendants at each stage of the proceedings.
Id.
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to meet the legal services alternative under Bounds, 59 can satisfy a state's
obligation to provide legal materials to an incarcerated pro se defendant since
to so conclude would obviate the pro se right.160 Of course there are difficulties associated with the costs of providing legal materials to,' 6 ' and appropriate security for, an incarcerated pro se defendant preparing a defense;
but the security problems, if such there are,162 are being met at the prisons
which, under Bounds, are providing law libraries for prisoners. 163 Access to
legal materials, moreover, does not mean releasing a defendant so that he
may use the local law library; legal materials may be brought to him instead. 6 4 Finally, the difficulties thrust on the state when confronted with the
problem of providing access to the incarcerated pro se defendant pale in
159It is also error to conclude, as the court did in Walle v. Sigler, 456 F.2d 1153, 1156 (8th
Cir. 1972), that the provision of stand-by counsel satisfies any obligation to provide a pro se
defendant with access to legal materials to prepare his defense. Provision of stand-by counsel has
often been recommended as a way to assist the pro se defendant. 422 U.S. at 834-35 n.46;
United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1124-26 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Note, The Sixth
Amendment-Self-Representation and the Assistance of Counsel, 29 ARK. L. REv. 546, 551-52
(1976); Comment, Faretta v. California:An Examination of Its ProceduralDeficiencies, 7 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REv. 553, 567 (1975); Note, A Fool For A Client: The Supreme Court
Rules on the Pro Se Right, 37 U. PrIT. L. REv. 403, 404 (1975); Cf. Draper v. Washington, 372
U.S. 487, 492 (1963) (Counsel provided to pro se petitoner at hearing on request for free
transcript).
'"Several cases decided prior to Faretta did just that, however. These cases recognized the
constitutional right to a pro se defense but nonetheless denied access to legal materials to the pro
se defendant. E.g., Lee v. Stynchombe, 347 F. Supp. 1076, 1079 (N.D. Ga. 1972); Walle v.
Sigler, 329 F. Supp. 1278, 1282 (D. Neb. 1971), affd, 456 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir. 1972) (affirmed
on ground that stand-by counsel was provided). Cf People v. Noah, 5 Cal. 3d 469, 479, 487
P.2d 1009, 1015-16, 96 Cal. Rptr. 441, 447-48 (1971) (defendant chose representation by counsel
after being denied access to legal materials). Other pre-Faretta cases found that incarcerated
defendants were not entitled to access to a law library if adequate legal services were offered.
Walle v. Sigler, 456 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir. 1972) aff'g 329 F. Supp. 1278, 1282 (D. Neb. 1971);
Miller v. Carson, 401 F. Supp. 835, 885 (M.D. Fla. 1975); Farrington v. North Carolina, 391 F.
Supp. 714 (M.D. N.C. 1975). See Cruz v. Hauck, 515 F.2d 322, 331-32 (5th Cir. 1975) (decided
on same day as Faretta) (prior history omitted), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 917 (1976). In these cases,
however, the courts primarily were concerned with habeas corpus or Section 1983 actions and did
not have before them consideration of a constitutional right to defend pro se at trial and the impact of that right on access to legal materials. In one pre-Farrettacase the court refused even to
find that there was any obligation whatsoever to provide either legal services or legal materials to
inmates of county jails. Page v. Sharpe, 487 F.2d 567, 569 (1st Cir. 1973).
In at least one case since Farrettathe pro se right has been found to encompass the right to
access to legal materials. Martinez Rodriguez v. Jiminez, 409 F. Supp. 582, 594 (D.P.R.), affd
on other grounds, 537 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1976), affd, 551 F.2d 877 (1977). Cf. Bailey v. Pitchess,
No. 72-1957-F (C.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 1972). But see Tate v. Kassulke, 409 F. Supp. 651, 657-59
(W.D. Ky. 1976) (court "inclined" to hold law libraries unnecessary; did not cite Faretta nor
discuss constitutional pro se right).
61
' Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969). See Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S.
189, 201 (1971) (Burger, C. J., concurring). These costs may fall particularly heavily on local
jails. There are many recommendations now to have the state assume responsibility for the operation and maintenance of local jails. E.g., UCA, § 2-404 supra note 72.
162People v. Noah, 5 Cal. 3d 469, 487 P.2d 1009, 1015-16, 96 Cal. Rptr. 441 (1971); ABA
RESOURCE CENTER. supra note 22, at 428.
'See, e.g., ABA RESOURCE CENTER, supra note 22, at 428.
164See note 207 infra & text accompanying. See, e.g., UCA, § 4-108 supra note 72.
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comparison to the insurmountable burden placed on the pro se defendant
unable to prepare because he is incarcerated.
The Prisoner
If the incarcerated defendant has a right of access to legal materials, not
in the alternative but as a necessary corollary to his right to conduct his own
defense, what, if anything, does this mean for the prisoner? Unlike the right
to a criminal trial and to an attorney at that trial, there is no federal constitutional right to an appeal 65 or to the assistance of an attorney when appealing 166 or collaterally attacking a conviction. 67 Once a state elects to provide for appeal as of right from a criminal conviction, however, it must pro68
vide counsel for indigents.
Although many states and the federal government provide by statute for
appointment of counsel when a prisoner makes a prima facie showing of good
cause, 69 there are still many appellate and collateral proceedings today in
16 5E.g., McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894).
"'6Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 488 (1969). See United States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S.
317, 323 (1976).
16Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 488 (1969); Werner, Law Library Service to
Prisoners-TheResponsibility of Nonprison Libraries, 63 LAw LIB. J. 231, 232 (1970). See People v. Shipman, 62 Cal. 2d 226, 229, 397 P.2d 993, 996 42 Cal. Rptr. 1, 4 (1965). Cf. Note,
Criminal Procedure-Post-ConvictionRight to Counsel, 77 W. VA. L. Rzv. 571, 589 (1975).
"'Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 607 (1974); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963);
Note, Criminal Procedure-Post-ConvictionRight to Counsel, 77 W. VA. L. REv. 571, 576-77
(1975). In connection with indigents appealing their convictions, the Supreme Court also has
held that an attorney representing an indigent on appeal cannot withdraw from what he considers a frivolous case without first preparing a brief setting forth defendant's points. Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). The Anders rule created what many consider ethical and practical problems for attorneys representing clients with frivolous claims. E.g., Hermann, Frivolous
Criminal Appeals, 47 N.Y.U. L. REv. 701, 703-04; Note, Withdrawal of Appointed Counsel
From FriiolousIndigent Appeals, 49 IND. L.J. 740, 740-46 (1974). Most state courts have followed the Anders procedures without comment. E.g., McCracken v. State, 439 P.2d 448, 449 (Alas.
1968); Walker v. Brewer, 189 N.W.2d 605, 607 (Iowa 1971); State v. Franklin, 78 N.M. 127,
428 P.2d 982 (1967). Other state courts were critical of the procedure but found themselves
bound by it. E.g., Williams v. State, 44 Ala. App. 618, 217 So.2d 830 (1969); People v. Brown,
106 Ill. App.2d 477, 245 N.E.2d 548 (1969); Commonwealh v. McMillan, 212 Pa. Super. 48,
240 A.2d 380 (1968); State v. Romano, 29 Utah 2d 237, 507 P.2d 1025 (1973). Still other courts
have varied the Anders procedure. E.g., Bolick v. State, 127 Ga. App. 542, 194 S.E.2d 302
(1972); In re Hoffman, 382 Mich. 66, 168 N.W.2d 229 (1969); Sanchez v. State, 85 Nev. 95, 450
P.2d 793 (1969); Cleghorn v. State, 55 Wis. 2d 466, 198 N.W.2d 577 (1972). Several state courts
have refused to permit the appointed attorney to withdraw. E.g., McClendon v. People, 174 Colo. 7, 481 P.2d 715 (1971); Dixon v. State, 154 Ind. App. 603, 284 N.E.2d 102 (1972); States v.
Gates, 466 S.W.2d 681 (Mo. 1971).
"'9See, e.g., Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 493 (Douglas, J., concurring); Brief for
Respondents at 29, Bounds v. Smith, 420 U.S. 817 (1977); People v. Shipman, 62 Cal. 2d 226,
397 P.2d. 993, 997, 42 Cal. Rptr. 1, (1965); Bluth, supra not 17, at 59. For a sampling of such
statutes, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1970); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:158A-5 (West. 1971) and N.J.
CRiM. PRAC. R. 3.22-6; MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 95-1004 et seq. (1947); NEV. REv. STAT. §
177.345 (1973); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38 § 122-4 (Smith-Hurd 1973) and ILL. Sup. CT. R. 651;
CAL. GOv'T CODE §§ 15421 and 27706 (West 1976); Tax. CIV. CODE ANN. tit. 4A, § 1917 (Vernon 1964); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 967.06 (West 1975). See People v. Shipman, 62 Cal. 2d 226-29,
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which a prisoner has no constitutional or statutory right to appointment of
counsel.1 70 It is in this context, of course, that the prisoner right of access to
either adequate legal services or adequate legal materials developed. Since
supplying enough lawyers to meet the caseload demand of prisoners will be
extremely costly,17 ' at least in the forseeable future this will mean establish-

ment and maintenance by the states of law libraries at correctional facilities. 172
Assuming that the day arrives in a particular state when adequate legal services are provided, will a prisoner truly be foreclosed from asserting that he
prefers to proceed, as, historically, he would have been compelled to proceed,
without the assistance of counsel? The underpinnings of the Faretta decision
would seem to indicate that the answer to that question should be no. 7 3
Although the pro se right in Faretta was found in the sixth amendment
the Court also spoke in language that sounded in due process terms and it is
not completely clear to what extent, if any, the Faretta Court relied on due
process concepts in reaching its result. 74 The right of free choice, described
in Faretta as a right of "inestimable worth,"17 5 is most often found in due
397 P.2d 993, 996, 42 Cal. Rptr. 1, 4 (1965). In a few states an indigent need only request stateappointed counsel in a habeas proceeding. E.g., People v. La Vallee, 26 App. Div. 2d 8. 270
N.Y.S. 2d 340 (1966). Moreover, counsel must be provided an indigent who challenges a trial
judge's certification that his appeal is not taken in good faith. Johnson v. United States, 352 U.S.
565, 566 (1957). A prisoner has no due process right, however, to argue his case on appeal. Price
v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285-86 (1948). The writ of habeas corpus may be used to obtain the
presence of a prisoner at the hearing if his presence is reasonably necessary to achieve justice. Id.
at 280-84.
170For example, there is no obligation to provide counsel to indigents for a discretionary appeal after an appeal as of right or when seeking certiorari from the United States Supreme
Court. See Ross v. Moffitt 417 U.S. 600, 610, 617 (1974). Left unanswered is whether there is a
right to counsel at a discretionary appeal in the absence of procedures for appeal as of right in
the State.
"'E.g., ABA RESOURCE CENTER, supra note 22, at 423; Wexler, supra note 22, at 153. The
State has the burden of showing that the demand has been met. See note 26 supra.
"The imediate state response to the Bounds decision was "a marked increase in inquiries
and purchases of legal materials for prison law libraries." Letter from Charles Kitzen, Executive
Director, Special Projects, West Publishing Co., Inc., to J. R. Potuto (Aug. 25, 1977) [on file in
Uniform Corrections Act Project Office, University of Nebraska Law College, Lincoln, Neb.].
1"The answer, in any case, should be consistent with the scope of the right to prepare that
is afforded to pro se incarcerated defendants. If the court were to decide that the pro se trial
right does not include any right to use law books to prepare a case then neither would the pro se
prisoner, who could have been assisted by counsel, have that right. A reverse argument has been
made: since the pro se prisoner is seen to have a due process need of legal materials, then so
should the pro se defendant. The Jailed Pro Se Defendant, supra note 136, at 300 n.38. This
argument, however, overlooks the fact that the pro se prisoner is given the right to legal
materials expressly because he has no right to be represented by counsel.
To the extent that the prisoner right of access includes civil cases, it would be similarly true
that the civil litigant should be able to proceed pro se whether or not counsel is available. And
again, if the right to proceed pro se as an incarcerated defendant includes the right to prepare
then a prisoner representing himself in a civil case to which the right of access attaches should
have that same due process right.
174422 U.S. at 818, 829-30.
"151d. at 834. The Court said that this right was highly prized by the founding fathers. See
id. at 833-34.
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process.176 The Court believed that the defendant's free choice to proceed pro
se must be honored out of "that respect for the individual which is the
lifeblood of the law."' 7 7 This deference to individual determinism, again,
sounds in due process terms:
[individual determinism] may be judicially derived from extra-constitutional,
natural law sources embodied in the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments, in an effort to prevent unduly burdensome interferences
with individual liberties. . . . [D]ue process may be employed to articulate
fundamental rights affording respect for individual autonomy not expressly
reflected by the Bill of Rights ....178
Whether the pro se right at the criminal trial derives from the fifth or
sixth amendment, it would not appear to be necessary to duplicate the evolution of the sixth amendment pro se trial right-by first finding a constitutional right to the appointment of counsel and then finding that an individual has the right to forego that right and proceed pro se' 7 9-before it is
possible to find a pro se right. This is an illogical way to proceed to find a
pro se right and points up the fact that those cases in which there is a right
to appointed counsel present the hardest case for even finding the pro se
right.
An investigation of the reasons why the Faretta Court found it repugnant
to force an attorney on an unwilling defendant demonstrates that those same
reasons exist for the prisoner. The Faretta Court felt that a defendant forced
to have a lawyer represent him will distrust the criminal justice system and
feel that he has been treated unfairly by it.8s° Certainly that sense of distrust
and unfairness would be equally prevalent among prisoners who, in the first
instance, were probably indigent defendants' 8 ' represented' 82 by appointed
"'6See Comment, Faretta v. California: An Examination of Its Procedural Deficiencies, 7
COLUM. HUMAN L. REV. 553, 554 (1975); Comment, The Pro Se Defendant: No Right to Say
No, 23 EMORY L. J. 523, 530-31 (1974); Comment, Examination of the Sixth Amendment Right
to Choose Retained Counsel, 60 IowA L. REV. 328, 331-32 (1974); Note, A Fool For a Client:
The Supreme Court Rules on the Pro Se Right, 37 U. PIrr. L. REv. 403, 409 (1975); Note, The
Right to Defend Pro Se-Faretta v. California: Due Process and Beyond, 11 TULSA L. J. 365,
381-82 (1976). Cf Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 280 (1942) (waiver of
jury trial by per se defendant).
1'422 U.S. at 834 (Quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 350-51 Brennan, J.,concurring).
See Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 280 (1942).
'"Note, The Right to Defend Pro Se-Farettav. California: Due Process and Beyond, 11
TULSA L.J. 365, 381-82 (1976). See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). See also cases and
authorities cited at note 176 supra.
"'The Court has rejected the theory that a constitutional right necessarily includes its converse. See, e.g., Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 34-35 (1965); Comment, Faretta v. California: An Examination of Its ProceduralDeficiencies, 7 CoLUM. HuMAN L. Rav. 553, 556 (1975).
11422 U.S. at 834.
"'See, e.g., Jacob & Sharma, supra note 80, at 510-11; note 98 supra. There is some
evidence to suggest that defendants with retained counsel are more likely to avoid prison
sentences. See Nagel, Effects of Alternative Types of Counsel on CriminalProcedure Treatment,
48 IND. L.J. 404, 414-16 (1973).
"'The great majority of defendants at trial choose, and will undoubtedly continue to
choose, to be represented by counsel. It can be argued, moreover, that the stricter the standard
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counsel at trial 83 and, with the assistance of appointed counsel, lost their
cases.1 84 The prisoner, just like the pro se defendant,' 8s will suffer the conse-

quences of representing himself. And certainly if the possibility exists,
however remote the Faretta Court thought the possibility was, that a pro se
defendant could present a better defense for himself than a licensed attorney, 8 6 that possibility should be at least as good for the prisoner. 87 It is

often asserted, after all, that the trial itself is too complex and fraught with
legal technicalities to be easily understood by the layperson.' 88 There is,

moreover, little time during the trial to consider legal questions and ponder
arguments at leisure. This too puts the layperson at a disadvantage. When

contesting a conviction, however, whether on direct-appeal or by collateral
attack, the need for familiarity with legal issues may be less acute'8 9 and, at
the same time, a prisoner has more opportunity to prepare, if not perfect, his
claim. 90 Further, the reasons generally given to explain why a person would
for evaluating the effectiveness of counsel, the fewer the defendants who will choose to proceed
pro se. Cf. Hermann, Frivolous CriminalAppeals, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 701, 715-20 (1972) (Effectiveness of counsel on appeal).
8
sIndigent defendants are provided with either assigned private counsel or with an attorney
from the public defender's office. Tague, An Indigents' Right to the Attorney of His Choice, 27
STAN. L. REv. 73, 77 (1974). An indigent defendant has no right to select an attorney of his
choice. United States ex rel. Fletcher v. Maroney, 280 F. Supp. 277, 279 (W.D. Pa.), affd 413
F.2d 15 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 873 (1968); Conroy v. United States, 296 F. Supp. 693,
695 (N.D. Okla. 1969). See Wainwright v. Sykes, 97 S. Ct. 24, 97, 2520-21 (Brennan, J., dissenting). This is true even when alternative counsel of the indigent's choice is available and willing
to proceed under the same arrangements as appointed counsel. See Comment, Examination of
the Sixth Amendment Right to Choose Retained Counsel, 60 Tague, An Indigents Right to the
Attorney of His Choice, 27 STAN. L. Rav. 73, 81 (1974). See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53
(1932). Several courts, in their discretion, have appointed an attorney chosen by an indigent
See, e.g., State v. Taborsky, 147 Conn. 194, 158 A.2d 239, 243 (1960).
defendant.
84
1 See generally ABA RESOURCE CENTER, supra note 22, at 423-24.
111422 U.S. at 834.
1861d.
1871t is often suggested that the pro se prisoner should have an easier time. E.g, The Jailed
Pro Se Defendant, supra note 136, at 306. See Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 610-11 (1974). But
cf. Blumberg, Covert Contingencies in the Right to the Assistance of Counsel, 20 VAND. L. REv.
581, 585 (1967).
8
E.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
1'
(1963); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
89
1 See Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969); Cochran v. Kansas, 316 U.S. 255 (1942);
Jacob & Sharma, supra note 80, at 253; Note, Right to Aid in Addition to Councilfor Indigent
Criminal Defendants, 47 MINN. L. REV. 1054, 1074-75 (1963); The Jailed Pro Se Defendant,
supra note 145, at 306; Brief for Respondents at 43-44; Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
But see Larsen, supra note 22, at 351, 360. Contra, AJailhouse Lawyer's View, supra note 17, at
139-40; Krause, A Lawyer Looks at Writ-Writing, 56 CALIF. L. REv. 371, 374 (1968); Zeigler &
Hermann, supra note 22, at 202 (1972); Note, Trial Court and Prison Perspectives on the Collateral Post Conviction Relief Process in Florida, 21 U. FLA. L. REV. 503, 508 (1969).
9
' OThat convicted prisoners have the time to pursue, if not perfect, their claims is borne out

by the number of habeas corpus and section 1938 actions filed. Almost 20% of the federal
caseload is pro se; 95% of the pro se filings are by prisoners (both state and federal). Zeigler &
Hermann, supra note 22, at 159-60.
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forego the assistance of an attorney at trial-doubts about the competence,' 9'
loyalty, 192 or diligence' 93 of appointed counsel, and the defendant's belief in
his own ability to handle his case' 94 -apply with equal force to prisoners.
"'As to their doubts about the competence of attorneys representing them, see Adams v.
United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 280 (1942); AJailhouse Lawyer's View, supra note
17, at 137-38; Larsen, supra note 22, at 346; Note, The Representation of indigent Criminal
Defendants in the Federal District Courts, 76 HARV. L. REV. 579, 603 (1963); The Jailed Pro Se
Defendant, supra note 136, at 293-94 n.7. See ABA RESOURcE CENTER, supra note 22, at 423-24.
I2As to their doubts about attorney loyalty, see ABA RESOURCE CENTER, supra note 22, at
423-24; A Jailhouse Lawyer's View, supra note 17, at 137-38; Reeves, supra note 26, at 145;
Note, The Right to Defend Pro Se: Faretta v. California and Beyond, 40 ALB. L. REv. 423,
424-25 (1976); Note, The Representation of Indigent CriminalDefendants in the FederalDistrict
Courts, 76 HARV. L. REv. 579, 603 (1963); Note, Legal Services for Prison Inmates, 1967 Wis. L.
REV. 514, 528; The Jailed Pro Se Defendant, supra note 136, at 293-94 n.7 (1976).
19See Zeigler & Herman, supra note 22, at 213; Note, Legal Services for Prison Inmates,
1967 Wis. L. REv. 514, 525, 526; Note, The Jailed Pro Se Defendant, supra note 136, at 293-294
n.7. The lack of due diligence, at least for attorneys handling collateral attacks for prisoners,
may relate to a perception that such petititons are frivolous. Pro se petitioners, in fact, are not
always taken serioulsy by the courts. See Turner, supra note 15, at 503-04.
Part of the preception that prisoner claims are frivolous derives from appeals of convictions
by indigent prisoners. See note 168 supra. The problems created by frivolous appeals and habeas
corpus petitions are many. E.g, Flannery & Robbins, The Misunderstood Pro Se Litigant: More
than A Pawn in the Game, 41 BROOKLYN L. REv. 769, 770 (1975); Hermann, Frivolous Criminal
Appeals, 47 N.Y.U. L. REv. 701, 702 (1970); Larsen, supra note 22, at 360; 56 CALIF. L. REv.
342, 342-43 (1968); Note, Trial Court and Prison Perspectives on the CollateralPost Conviction
Relief Process in Florida, 21 U. FLA. L. REv. 503, 509-12 (1969). The difficulty the courts face in
dealing with appeals and habeas petitions of indigents is, of course, how to structure the system
to avoid the frivolous claims while assuring that the meritorious ones one heard. E.g, Note,
Withdrawal of Appointed Counsel From Frivolous Indigent Appeals, 49 IND. L.J. 740, 740-41
(1974); Inmate Legal Services, supra note 22, at 514. Some courts have considered use of their
contempt power for petitioners bringing frivolous claims. See Note, Trial Court and Prison
Perspectives on the Collateral Post Conviction Relief Process in Florida, 21 U. FLA. L. REv. 503,
507 (1969). Cf. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 571, 381-82 (1971) (sanctions such as penalties
for false pleading can be assessed against litigant wiht frivolous claim). Other jurisdictions require that indigent convicted persons, whether probationers or prisoners, repay prosecution costs
if they are able. See, e.g., Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40 (1974) (holding the Oregon repayment
provision constitutional). This would be feasible if prisoners were paid a living wage. See note 98
supra. A living wage would also mean that a prisoner could not file habeas petitions in forma
pauperis. This, presumably, would decrease the number of frivolous petitions filed. See, e.g.,
Herman, Frivolous CriminalAppeals, 47 N.Y.U. L. REv. 701, 701-07 (1972); Note, Withdrawal
of Appointed Counsel From Frivolous Indigent Appeals, 49 IND. L.J. 740, 741-42 (1974); Inmate
Legal Services, supra note 22, at 527 n.36.
" Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1969). See Bolick v. State, 127 Ga. App. 542,
194 S.E.2d 302, 303 (1972). Note, The Right to Defend Pro Se: Faretta v. California and
Beyond, 40 ALB. L. REv. 423, 425 (1976); The Jailed Pro Se Defendant, supra note 136, t 293-94
n.7 (1976). As do, of course, many of the reasons given why, at least as a policy matter,
assistance of lawyers is preferred over self-representation. These include the pro se's poor eductional background and consequent inability to articulate, his lack of proficiency in the law, and
his subjectivity with respect to his own case. For information as to poor educational background,
see note 134 supra. For comments on the subjectivity of the pro se litigant, see A Jailhouse
Lawyer's View, supra note 17, at 139; Jacob & Sharma, supra note 80, at 519; Larsen, supra
note 22, at 347; Zeigler & Hermann, supra note 22, at 181-82. Certainly courts and commentators in the past several years have found strong policy reasons for requiring, or encouraging,
provision of attorneys in various proceedings. See notes 90 and 108 supra; ABA RESOURCE
CENTER, supra note 22, at 834-87; Jacob & Sharma, supra note 80, at 521-23; Werner, supra
note 26, at 268; Prisoners' Rights, supra note 22, at 290-91. See Bluth, supra note 17, at 59;
Note, Trial Court and Prison Perspectives on the Collateral Post Conviction Relief Process in
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More important than the similarities between the pro se defendant and
the pro se prisoner is the difference in relative strain the two pro se's place on
the societal interest in fairness and a just result. It can hardly be denied that
the interest in a fair trial is an interest that society, in its respect for ordered
liberty, must uphold.1 95 Society may not deprive a defendant of a fair trial
which affords him due process. It can be strongly argued, in turn, that a
defendant may not deprive society of the responsibility- and privilege-to
assure his fair trial. As Chief Justice Burger stated in his dissent to the Faretta
result:
Nor is it accurate to suggest . . . that the quality of his representation at trial
is a matter with which only the accused is legitimately concerned ...
Although we have adopted an adversary system of criminal justice, . . . the
prosecution is more than an ordinary litigant, and the trial judge is not simply an automaton who insures that technical rules are adhered to. Both are
charged with the duty of insuring that justice, in the broadest sense of that
term, is achieved in every criminal trial. . . . That goal is ill-served, and the
integrity of and public confidence in the system are undermined, when an
easy conviction is obtained due to the defendant's ill-advised decision to waive
counsel. The damage thus inflicted is not mitigated by the lame explanation
that the defendant simply availed himself of the "freedom" "to go to jail
under his own banner" . . . .. 19
Florida, 21 U. FLA. L. REv. 503, 513 (1969). Nonetherless, the defendant electing selfrepresentation may well do a good job and may even do a better job than appointed counsel. 422
U.S. at 834; See Bolick v. State, 127 Ga. App. 542, 194 S.E.2d 302, 303 (1972); Brief for
Respondents at 43-44, Bounds v. Smith, 420 U.S. 817 (1977); Bazelon, Defective Assistance of
Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 1. 4 (1973); Note, The Right to Defend Pro Se: Faretta v. California and Beyond, 40 ALB. L. REv. 423, 426 (1976); The Representation of Indigent Criminal
Defendants in the Federal District Courts, 76 HARV. L. REV. 579, 596 (1963); Note, Adequate
Appellate Review for Indigents: A Judicial Blend of Adequate Transcript and Effecive Counsel,
52 IowA L. Rav. 902, 920-27 (1967).
The reasons for proceeding pro se at trial or after conviction are not always similar. A
defendant at trial might choose to proceed pro se to make a favorable impression on the jury
without testifying and thus subjecting himself to cross-examination. E.g., Note, The Right to Defend Pro Se: Farettav. Californiaand Beyond, 40 ALB. L. REv. 423, 425 (1976); The Jailed Pro
Se Defendant, supra note 145, at 293-94 n.7. He might also choose self-representation as a
political statement or in order to make such a statement. Note, The Right To Defend Pro Se:
Farettav. Californiaand Beyond, 40 ALB. L. REv. 423, 427 (1976). The prisoner might prefer to
proceed pro se as a way to keep busy. It has also been described as a way to put the prisoner's
energies to productive use. Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 498 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring).
Contra, Cardarelli & Finkelstein, supra note 98, at 97. If there were full employment in the
prisons then prisoners would have less free time to pursue these activities. Full employment,
however, is not at present the situation in prisons. E.g., Levy, Abram, & LaDow, Final Report
on Vocational Preparation in U.S. Correctional Institutions, iii-iv (U.S. Dept. of Labor 1975).
195422 U.S. at 839 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344
(1963); Grano,. The Right to Counsel: Collateral Issues Affecting Due Process, 54 MINN. L. REV.
1175, 1194-96 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Grano].
196422 U.S. at 839 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The majority decision in Faretta has also been
criticized on the ground that its discussion of the historical pro se right, while accurate, removes
the right from its historical context, a context quite different from the rights afforded at, and the
procedures of, the modern criminal trial. Id. at 850 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Grano, supra
note 195, at 1190-94; Note, A Foolfor A Client: The Supreme Court Rules on the Pro Se Right,
37 U. Prrr. L. Rav. 403, 408 (975). It has been pointed out that in the United States the pro se
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These reasons, which weigh heavily against finding a pro se right at trial,
have much less force once a defendant has been adjudicated guilty in a fair
trial in which the degree of his culpability was fully and fairly litigated. This
is, of course, the major reason why a state need not provide for appellate
review of convictions. 97 Thus the societal interest in assuring justice is much
less likely to be implicated in proceedings pursued by a pro se prisoner than
in the trial at which a defendant represents himself.
It thus seems that the interests in fundamental fairness that led the Faretta Court to find a sixth amendment right in a defendant to proceed pro se
should also require that a prisoner, as a fifth amendment right, be permitted
the opportunity to refuse the attorney alternative thrust upon him by the
state. And this, not surprisingly, is the historical stance in which is found the
appellate pro se right even before Faretta: "[t]he right to represent oneself,
even in post-adjudicative proceedings, has been recognized in court and
stands as a fundamental constitutional right."1 98
If the prisoner can refuse the assistance of counsel as a constitutional
right, then, again, that right of refusal can only have meaning if he has the
concomitant due process right to prepare to represent himself. Thus it appears that the Bounds due process right of access which allows the state to
provide either law libraries or legal materials-at the state's choice-is a flawed
constitutional theory. If the prisoner has a right of access then he has the
right, if he so chooses, to represent himself. And that means access to law
books. The choice afforded the states under the Bounds right of access,
therefore, should be whether to provide law libraries only or both law
libraries and legal assistance. Legal assistance, standing alone, cannot suf199
fice.
There is one clear benefit to a system in which the pro se prisoner
chooses, in the face of counsel ready to represent him, to represent himself.
At present, courts feel compelled to lean toward the indigent prisoner in
reading his petition and in construing his claim because the prisoner has no
right may have developed because of a lawyer shortage and not because of a deeply-held principle. Grano, supra note 195, at 1193; Note, A Fool For A Client: The Supreme Court Rules on
the Pro7 Se Right, 37 U. Prrr. L. REv. 403, 408 (1975).
1"See note 192 supra; United States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317, 323 (1976); Chaffin v.
Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 24 n.11 (1973); District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S.'617, 627
(1937); Note, Adequate Appellate Review for Indigents: A JudicialBlend of Adequate Transcript
and Effective Counsel, 52 IowA L. REv. 902, 904 (1967). Cf Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266,
285-86 (1948).
"'ABA REsouRcE CENTER, supra note 22, at 424 (emphasis added). See Johnson v. United
States, 352 U.S. 565, 566 (1957) (per curiam); Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 280, 285-86
(1948); Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269 (1942); Note, The Right of An
Accused to Proceed Without Counsel, 49 MINN. L. REv. 113 (1965). Cf.28 U.S.C. §§ 1654 (parties
to "plead and manage their own causes personally").
"'See note 140 supra. This is true despite the fact that many commentators think provision
of legal services is preferable to provision of law libraries. Werner, supra note 26, at 268; Zieglar
& Hermann, supra note 22, at 173-76, 201-12; Note, Legal Services for Prison Inmates, 1967
Wis. L. REv. 514, 523-24. See United States v. Simpson, 436 F.2d 162, 167 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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other option available to him, 00 but once the prisoner has counsel available
to him and elects not to use counsel, a court would no longer have to treat a
pro se prisoner's claims any differently than those filed by an attorney. It
would thus be true, with perhaps more force than it is true of the pro se
defendant, that the pro se prisoner would be held to the "same ground rules"
201
required of a lawyer presenting a case.
BOUNDS LAW LIBRARY ALTERNATIVE: WHAT IS ADEQUATE?

The Bounds prisoner right of access then, appears flawed to the extent
that it describes the state's obligation in the alternative and it may well be extended beyond its present parameters of habeas corpus and Section 1983 actions. But, considering the right as it is presently described by the Bounds
Court, what precisely does the Court require of a state that chooses to provide
law libraries to meet its right of access burden? What, in other words, con02
stitutes an "adequate" law library?
Although the Bounds holding speaks in terms of law libraries it is not
completely clear whether the state must provide law libraries in prisons or
whether it may meet its burden by assuring access to law books and legal
materials stored in other libraries. Law libraries outside prisons are now providing law books and other services to prisoners. 203 It is surely true as, indeed,
the facts in Bounds itself indicate, 20 4 that each state correctional facility, no
matter how small, will not have to house a library.205 Does Bounds, then, require that a prisoner be able to be physically present in the law library or will
it be sufficient if the books he needs are brought to him?
It is possible to devise a system, as is contemplated by the North Carolina
plan in Bounds, in which prisoners are transported to a law library. 20 6 Since
the North Carolina plan was found adequate in Bounds, this procedure, at
least, passes constitutional muster. It is also possible, of course, to transport
20

The present appellate court approach in reviewing pro se appeals and habeas petitions is
to "go out of their way to give fair consideration to those who are unrepresented." Douglas v.
California, 372 U.S. 353, 366 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Accord, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.
519, 520 (1972) (per curiam); Cochran v. Kansas, 316 U.S. 255, 258 (1942).
211422 at 808 n.2.
22
Bounds v. Smith, 420 U.S. 817, 828 (1977).
"03Poe, A Spark of Hope for Prisoners, 66 LAW LIB.J. 59, 60 (1973). The American Association of Law Libraires is on record as willing to assist in providing prisoners with law books and
legal materials. See Reeves, supra note 26, at 131.
t 4
2 North Carolina has seventy-seven correctional units; under Bounds law libraries will be set
up in seven of these units with a smaller library set up in the central prison segregation unit. 420
U.S. at 819. The plan approved by the district court was affirmed by the Court of appeals except
for that part which would have established at the women's facility a library not equal to those in
the men's facilities. Smith v. Bounds, 538 F.2d 541. 545 (4th Cir. 1975). It was the plan as
modified by the Court of Appeals that was affirmed by the Supreme Court. 420 U.S. at 819.
205See UCA, supra note 72, § 4-801 and Comment, at 317-21 See ABA RESOURCE CENTER,
supra note 22, at 425-26.
206420 U.S at 819.
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law books to the prisoners. 20 7 Would a plan that contemplated bringing the
books to the prisoners likewise prove satisfactory under Bounds? Such a plan
would seem to have some difficulties associated with it since, presumably, a
prisoner, as indeed, a lawyer, must have access to the law library to deter-.
mine what materials he needs. A system in which books are brought to a
prisoner on request would seem to require that he know what he wants before
he is able to acquire it; this, however, hardly seems adequate or, indeed,
reasonable. It may, nonetheless, meet the Bounds test since the book list approved in Bounds contains no citators or digests. 20 8 Thus, even the prisoner
physically present at the library may have difficulty locating the materials he
needs.
Further, there is not in Bounds any clear standard for determining
whether access is "meaningful." The Court approaches the question in terms
of the number of hours a given prisoner will be able to spend in the law
library; 209 it never addresses the question of the "quality".of the time afforded
the prisoner. Yet even daily access to a library will be of little avail if each
day is spent waiting to obtain a copy of a particular title. It would seem,
then, that the relevant criterion in determining adequacy should be how likely it is that a prisoner will actually use books he needs and not merely how
often he will be afforded access to the law library itself. And, in fact, in
determining the meaningfulness of access most commentators focus on the
number of copies of titles necessary to meet prisoner needs. 210 Estimates of
the appropriate ratio of copies of titles to prisoners vary from one copy of
each title for every 300 prisoners to one copy of each title for every 500
21 2
prisoners. 211 The seven law libraries in Bounds must serve 13,000 prisoners;
with one set of the requisite law books 213 kept at each library2 14 the ratio of
prisoner to copies of titles is one to 1857. Thus, the plan approved in Bounds
appears woefully inadequate.
It was estimated by the state, moreover, that the Bounds plan would
allow a maximum of 350 prisoners to use the law libraries weekly. 219 This
207

A lending service or a law bookmobile could be maintained. See e.g., ABA RESOURCE
CENTER, supra note 22, at 425-26. There are additional problems created by prisoners in,for example, prison hospitals or administrative segregation; they too are entitled to access. E.g., Kirby
v. Blackledge, 530 F.2d 583, 586 (4th Cir. 1976); Adams v. Carlson, 488 F.2d 619, 634 (7th Cir.
1973); Johnson v. Anderson, 370 F. Supp. 1373, 1383 (D. Del. 1974) See ABA RESOURCE CENTER
note 22, at 429-30; The Jailed Pro Se Defendant, supra note 136, at 299.
211See notes 222-23 infra and text accompanying.
t 9
Even under this approach access hardly seems "meaningful. See notes 214-18 infra and
text accompanying.
210ABA RESOURc E CENTER, supra note 22, at 425. The appropriate ratio is not conducive to
simple resolution. See Reeves, supra note 26, at 151-56.
21id.
212420 U.S. at 1492-93 & n.3.
21sSee notes 222-25 infra and text accompanying with respect to the sufficiency of the book
list.
214
There is nothing in the Bounds opinion to require otherwise.
25420 U.S. at 819.
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figure is the result of the State's estimate that each of the seven facilities
could handle ten prisoners daily. 216 The State further estimated that prisoners
not facing court deadlines might wait three or four weeks for the opportunity
to use a library. 217 Yet even a conservative opinion of law library use by
prisoners estimates that 10 to 20 percent, or, in other words, 1300 to 2600 of
the 13,000 prisoners in the North Carolina system, will use a law library on a
"relatively consistent basis.1 218 Again, then, the ability to serve 350 prisoners
weekly seems to fall considerably short of what prisoner needs will probably
be.
It is difficult, therefore, to understand how access can be "meaningful"
when a prisoner can use a law library no more than once every three or four
weeks219 with no assurance that he will be able to use the books he wants
when he gets there. Yet this is all that is provided by the plan found adequate in Bounds.
Further, Bounds includes no specified minimum number of hours that
the law libraries will remain open. Nor does the Court recommend the optium total weekly hours that the library should be open. 220 This would appear
to be a significant omission when coupled with the fact that the Court did
not specify a copy to prisoner ratio for the titles provided. Particularly since
there may be only one copy of a title available in each library it would have
been useful to specify the hours daily that the library should remain open.
The longer the library day, after all, the more opportunity a prisoner will
have to use the books that he needs.
Another aspect of the state plan approved in Bounds that raises doubts as
to what the Court meant by "meaningful" is the list of law books approved as
adequate. 221 The list includes no state or federal decisions that are included
in reporters prior to 1960.222 Much more serious is the omission of Shepard's
216 Smith v. Bounds, 538 F.2d 541, 543 n.1 (4th Cir. 1975). Presumably, then, the State
plan did not contemplate weekend library use.
2117420 U.S. at 819. Under the plan prisoners will receive appointments for library use and
will be1 given one full day in the library per appointment. Id.
2 1ABA RESOURCE CENTER, supra note 22, at 428. Contra, Farrington v. State of North
391 F. Supp, 714, 717 (M.D.N.C. 1975) (no data on which opinion was based).
Carolina,
211 See In re Harrell, 2 Cal. 3d 675, 470 P.2d 60, 652, 87 Cal. Rptr. 504 (1970), cert. denied
401 U.S. 914 (1971) (one visit weekly is sufficient); Van Ermen v. Schmidt, 343 F. Supp. 377,
378, 379 (W.D. Wis. 1972) (two hours weekly states prima facie case that access is abridged).
22°There is general agreement among commentators that the law library should be open as
many hours as possible. ABA RESOURCE CENTER. supra note 22, at 429; AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL

Ass'N MANUAL CORRECTIONAL STANDARDS STD. (3d ed. 1966). Suggestions vary as to the optimal

number of hours. Reeves, supra note 26, at 151-56. Most prison law libraries are now open between thirty and forty hours weekly. See Werner, supra note 26, at 263. See, e.g, Hatifield v.
Bailleaux 290 F.2d 632, 638 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 862 (1961) (Thirty hours weekly);
Stevenson v. Reed, 391 F. Supp. 1375, 1384 (N.D. Miss. 1975), affd 530 F.2d 1207 (5th Cir.
1976) (thirty-seven and one-half hours weekly). More than forty percent of correctional law
libraries are open more than forty hours weekly. See Werner, supra note 26, at 263.
221420 U.S. at 819-20 n.4.

222
1d. The 1960 cut-off for reporters is the cut-off used by the American Association of Law
Libraries in its CHECKLIST ONE (minimum list of titles necessary to supply prison law library). See
note 224 infra.
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Citations 223 and case digests. It would seem imperative, particularly for non-

lawyers, that such locators of citations be provided. 24 This need is especially
acute because a prisoner may get to the library only once every three or four
weeks. It is certainly unfortunate that much of his time there could be spent
in an attempt merely to discover what books he needs. By contrast, the

American Association of Law Libraries compilation of those titles, which, at
a minimum, should be in a correctional law library, includes federal and
state citators as well as the state's digest.22 5 The Federal Bureau of Prisons
current lst also includes federal citators as well as the Modem Federal Practice Digest.

226

Finally, when focusing on what constitutes an adequate law library it is
important to consider whether and what ancillary services are provided. At
leasf in the prison context these services should include access to copying
machines, typewriters (and typists), legal forms, and writing paper. 227 The
plan approved in Bounds did provide for such services 228 and also contemplated training prisoners as research assistants and typists. 22 9 Thus, at
least in this respect the Bounds plan coincides with what prisoner needs appear to dictate.
The more complete the law library collection that is maintained and the
more varied the services that are offered, the more costs that are involved. It

would cost a state approximately $5000 to establish one prison law library
3

22 The Bounds majority called the absence of Shepard's citators a "questionable omission."
420 U.S. at 819-20 n.4. It nevertheless affirmed the plan.
4
22 See Larsen, supra note 22, at 335.
5
221t also includes material not on the list approved in Bounds. AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF
LAW LIBRARIES SPECIAL COMMIFTEE ON LAW LIBRARY SERVICES TO PRISONERS, CHECKLIST ONE:
MINIMUM COLLECTION FOR PRISON LAW LIBARIE. reprinted in ABA JOINT COMM.. supra note 22,
at 439-40. The Association, in CHECKLIST TwO, provides for an expanded prison law library collection. Id. at 441-43. The expanded list required that the reporters include volumes beginning
with 1950 and recommends that complete sets of other materials be maintained.
5
22 The Federal Bureau list is also much more extensive than the list provided in Bounds.
Memorandum from Office of General Counsel, Federal Bureau of Prisons (June 1977) (updated
list; earlier list found in Policy Statement 2001. 2B, May 8, 1972). See Werner, supra note 25, at
267-68. For other prison library law book lists, see, e.g., White v. Sullivan, 368 F. Supp. 292,
296-97 (S.D. Ala. 1973); Poe, A Spark of Hope of Prisoners, 66 LAW LIB. J. 59, " (1973).
t
22Many prison law libraries routinely provide such services. See e.g, Reeves, supra note 26,
at 160-61; Werner, supra, note 26, at 268-69.
228420 U.S. at 819.
29
2 1d. Training programs have been conducted, for example, in New York, Massachusetts,
Ohio, Arkansas, Minnesota, New York City, and Washington D.C. ABA RESOURCE CENTER,
supra note 27, at 427. Pamphlets have been prepared for prisoner use, and courses have been
taught on legal subjects. Jacob & Sharma, supra note 80, at 589-90. West Publishing Company
conducts such courses when setting up a correctional law library. Brief for Respondents at 48-49,
Bounds v. Smith, 420 U.S. 817 (1977). The course may be a one-day program or run fifty-six
hours; it is provided free or at no profit depending on the size of the law book purchase. Letter
from Charles Kitzen, Executive Director, Special Projects, West Publishing Co., Inc., to J.R.
Potuto (Aug. 25, 1977) (on file in Uniform Corrections Act Project Office, University of
Nebraska Law College, Lincoln, Neb.). The courses include the mechanics of legal research and
law library management. Id.
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that included everything in the American Association of Law Libraries
minimum book list; the expanded list would cost approximately $7000.230
The state of New Jersey prepared its own minimum list and estimated the
cost of supplying the books on it at $9,760 for each library. 231 Other estimates
run as high as $13,800232 and as low as $1,000. 2 33 These costs do not include
costs to keep the library current 234 or to pay staff to operate it.215 And, of
course, the estimates relate to those law books thought necessary to pursue a
habeas corpus or section 1983 action; it would cost more to establish a law
library that would allow prisoners to pursue other fundamental rights. Yet
these costs are insignificant when compared with total state expenditures235
and, in any case, a state may well be able to avoid even this negligible impact
on its budget. First of all, there are sources available to help defray costs of
setting up a correctional law library. 237 Secondly, many states even before Bounds had already provided complete or substantially complete law libraries
in their major facilities. 238 Of course, even if a state avoids these start-up costs
it may still incur building renovation costs in order to provide space in the
2s0See AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF LAw LIBRARIES, CHECKLISTS ONE & Two, reprinted in
ABA JOINT COMM. supra note 22, at 439-43; The Jailed Pro Se Defendant, supra note 136, at
305.
31
2 Werner, supra note 26, at 267.
'Id. at 269.
3
2' Brief for Respondents at 37, Bounds v. Smith, 420 U.S. 317 (1977). This is the estimate
of the Connecticut Department of Corrections and contemplates purchase of a microfilm reader
and microfilm materials.
34
2 Costs to keep a law library current have been estimated at $1800. Werner, supra note 26,
at 269. The actual costs depends, of course, on the size of the basic collection and the number of
copies of titles owned. A current collection is imperative. Reeves, supra note 26, at 143-44,
156-58. See, e.g., AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF LAw LIBRARIES, CHECKLIST ONE, reprinted in ABA
JOINT COMM.. supra note 22, at 440 and CHECKLIST Two, reprinted in ABA JOINT COMM., supra
note 22, at 443; Larsen, supra note 22, at 353-54.
2ssNor do they include replacement costs for lost or mutilated volumes. The book attrition
and mutilation rate is a particular problem when the library is understaffed. E.g., Spector, supra
note 17,
at 368-69.
36
2 These costs may loom more significant, however, if they are allocated to the overall
budget of the department of corrections.
7
21 See Reeves, supra note 26, at 166. The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, for
example, has assisted states to begin law libraries or legal services programs. See LEAA, A Compendium of Selected Criminal Justice Projects, 111-201, IV-360 to IV-368 (1975); 42 U.S.C. §§
3750-3750d (1970). See also Poe, A Spark of Hope for Prisoners, 66 LAw LIB. J. 59, 60 (1973).
21'In at least fourteen states, as well as the District of Columbia and the federal system, both
legal services and law libraries are already provided. See Brief for Respondents, Exhibit B.
Bounds v. Smith, 420 U.S. 817 (1977). At least forty states presently maintain law libraries for
confined persons. See id. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38 § 1003-7-2(a) (Smith-Hurd 1973). In fifteen of these, the libraries provided are well beyond minimal requirements. See Brief for
Respondents, Exhibit B, Bounds v. Smith, 420 U.S. 817 (1977); ABA RESOURCE CENTER. supra
note 22, at 423. In several other states substantial access is provided: for example, law libraries
are maintained in thirteen of sixteen Texas facilities, four of six Washington facilities, five of
eight Pennsylvania facilities, eight of nine Illinois facilities. See Brief for Respondents, Exhibit B.
Bounds v. Smith, 420 U.S. 817 (1977). Other states provide a complete collection in one facility,
and, in the other facilities, basic materials with the availability of intercorrectional library loans.
See id.
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prison for the library; and it will still have to meet continuation costs to keep
the collection current, pay staff, and meet other expenses. These costs do not
appear very high, however, when balanced against the constitutional right of
access and the positive results that such access should have on the prison
population.
CONCLUSION

The Bounds right of access appears to be a right in flux. Its appropriate
scope would have been one in which the states were obligated to expend
funds to aid prisoners to petition for writ of habeas corpus and were otherwise required not to impede prisoner access to the courts. But the Bounds
Court chose, instead, to include section 1983 actions within a state's obligation to expend funds. This Bounds right of prisoner access seems logically to
require further expansion-to at least all fundamental rights and perhaps
even to civil legal problems generally. It also appears that the right to an
adequate law library, described in Bounds as a right only in the absence of
adequate legal services, seems, on closer analysis, to require the establishment
of law libraries. Finally, whatever the eventual scope of the right, the Court's
acceptance of the library plan under consideration in Bounds leaves much
doubt as to how meaningful this meaningful right of access will prove to be.

